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ABSTRACT 
While the traditional agenda-setting theory assumes that a unified issue salience 
pattern (“the agenda”) will transfer from news media to the public, the emergence of the 
Internet has challenged this classic communication theory in three ways: by providing 
two versions of the public agenda (i.e., self-reported issue importance measured by a 
survey versus social media expressions), by affording two versions of the media agenda 
(i.e., presented on news websites versus on organizations’ Twitter accounts), and by 
enabling potential two-way agenda-setting effects. This dissertation aims to construct a 
multi-version two-way agenda-setting framework via (1) elaborating on the theoretical 
and practical reasons behind the proposed framework and (2) empirically testing the 
framework by combining survey and digital texts data around the 2020 US presidential 
election. The results show an imbalanced two-way agenda-setting relationship, with the 
traditional media-to-public direction still stronger than the reverse. While the two 
versions of the media agenda were similar to each other, what people thought was found 
to be different from what they tweeted.  
This dissertation also explored the moderating effects of issue-, media-, and 
 
 viii 
individual-level characteristics on the direction and strength of the agenda-setting effects. 
The issue-wise comparison showed stronger effects in both directions among obtrusive 
issues, compared to non-obtrusive issues. Interestingly, traditional, non-digital-native 
media presented a slightly stronger two-way agenda-setting relationship between their 
news tweets and citizens' tweets compared to digital-native media. This difference, 
however, was not found in news websites. Individuals with specific characteristics, such 
as being females, being older, being white, as well as having lower income, lower 
opinion leadership, and lower social capital, were more likely to influence and be 
influenced by the media agendas compared to their counterparts. Also, while the well-
educated population followed the agenda of news websites more closely, the group with a 
lower education level followed news tweets on more issues. Finally, the last chapter 
discusses theoretical, methodological, and practical implications.  
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction 
On May 25, 2020, Darnella Frazier recorded a video with her phone and uploaded 
it to Facebook. At the time, this 17-year-old teenager could never imagine that this 
seemingly ordinary social networking site (SNS) post would ignite the fury of millions 
and incite large-scale anti-racism protests worldwide.  
The death of George Floyd, a Black American who was cruelly murdered by a 
Minneapolis police officer during an arrest, was one of the most defining incidents in the 
US in 2020. It raised the salience of the issue of racism to an unprecedented level and 
even changed the direction of the 2020 US presidential election. Zuckerman et al. (2019) 
showed that 343 unarmed Black Americans were killed by police during 2013-2016, the 
years that witnessed the birth and growth of the Black Lives Matter movement. Most of 
these incidents were covered by the media briefly and soon slipped away from public 
attention.  
The Floyd case could have been one of them, but the Facebook video became a 
game changer: It provided solid evidence to refute the police’s press release, which 
defined the death as a “medical incident during [a] police interaction” (Levenson, 2021). 
It was the large number of ordinary people who shared, liked, and commented on this 
video on SNSs, especially the more open platforms like Twitter, that pressured the news 
media to follow up on this incident and the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) to re-
investigate it. In the delayed news coverage, we can see many quotes from SNS posts, 
which were already widely spread on Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram. We can even see 




articles about racism on news media. This time, it was not professional journalists who 
captured the breaking news, decided its newsworthiness, and set the public agenda. The 
public took the lead and set the media agenda. 
This story indicates the interactive two-way communication between the public 
and the media in digital spaces: the public can report breaking news, collectively raise 
issue salience, and the issue might be picked up by the news media, while the news media 
summarize public opinions and influence their readers. 
The process is afforded by the emergence of the easy-to-use SNSs. SNSs refer to 
web-based services on which people construct profiles, connect with other users, as well 
as view and traverse the lists of connections within the system (boyd & Ellison, 2007). 
The networked nature of SNS has contributed to the transformation of information flows 
from the traditional one-to-many mass communication mode to the many-to-many mass 
self-communication mode (Castells, 2007). The ways that the public and news media use 
SNSs have also extended the traditional definition of news beyond products of 
professional news organizations and changed how the broadly defined news is selectively 
produced, disseminated, and amplified.  
On the one hand, individual members of the public not only use SNSs as a source 
of news, but can also contribute to the information flow just like what professional news 
organizations do. Shearer and Grieco (2019) reported that 55% of U.S. adults used social 
media as one of their news sources often or sometimes in 2019; the number has also 
increased each year since 2016 and surpassed printed newspapers in 2018 (Shearer, 




now have the potential to share breaking news with millions in seconds, engage in public 
discussions initiated by others, strategically amplify an issue for societal attention, and 
collectively push an agenda to news media. Audiences have been replaced by users, who 
can be both message receivers and senders (Jenkins et al., 2013). 
On the other hand, the adoption of SNSs has changed how newsrooms work. 
Professional journalists use SNSs to not only share news and redirect traffic to the more 
traditional media platforms, but also to look for breaking news and monitor public 
opinion. The trend of media convergence, a phenomenon describing the blurred boundary 
and increased connectivity between media forms, since the 1980s has encouraged 
traditional news media to adopt a plurality of media formats, especially digital ones like 
news websites (Peil & Sparviero, 2017). Since the 1990s, traditional news organizations 
started to expand their existence online. Soon after, they adopted SNSs, including 
Facebook, Twitter, and MySpace, as channels to distribute news, market their brand, 
interact with audiences, and redirect traffic to their websites (Ju et al., 2014; Messner et 
al., 2012; Newman, 2009). By 2010, almost all major newspapers and television news 
organizations had built their SNSs landscape (Messner et al., 2012).  
Meanwhile, public expressions on SNSs, especially the more open ones like 
Twitter, are highly accessible and updated real-time. Journalists can easily search, 
browse, and collect information right after an incident occurs. Thus, they were 
increasingly used by journalists as a proxy of public opinion, to replace the one obtained 
from the traditional survey method. Previous studies also show that journalists are 




and to quote SNS posts as Vox Populi (Lukito et al., 2020), directly or indirectly with Big 
Data tools, such as Dataminr and NewsWhip. This synthesized public opinion on SNSs, 
then, could impact the journalists’ version of pseudo-environment, influence the relative 
importance of different issues in their mind, and potentially redefine newsworthiness.  
The daily routine changes on both sides altogether reflect a revolutionized power 
dynamic change. Castells (2013) proposed that power in the current network society, 
where the society is structured around digital networks of communication, should be 
redefined as the ability to shape social consent via communication. Earlier 
communication scholars stressed “media power,” which is the non-coercive bargaining 
power that media owners use to influence key actors in the society with their control over 
the information flow (Couldry & Curran, 2003). Yet, the above changes show that this 
power is not exclusively owned by professional news organizations. Chadwick (2017) 
argued that we are now living in a hybrid media system, where individuals, news 
organizations, and other political institutes can all work as actors in building information 
flows. SNSs play a vital (yet not determining) role in this power transformation by 
empowering the once voiceless individuals. While many SNSs studies focused on how 
technologies can connect ordinary citizens for grassroots social movements (e.g., Freelon 
et al., 2016; Tufekci, 2017; Yang, 2008), we should not ignore a longer-term and subtler 
way of the public making social changes: through the aggregated power of influencing 
the information flow with scattered daily online expression. This relatively understudied 
route calls for theoretical explication and empirical demonstration of the “people’s 





Media effect research, generally speaking, examines all impacts created by 
communication activities on individuals and society. Since the early 20th century, media 
effect theories have developed from the theory of uniform and strong influences to 
theories of selective and indirect effects (Lowery & DeFleur, 1995). Yet, the idea of 
“media” has been largely limited to professional mass media. Even when the public’s 
initiative was considered, much emphasis was put on their selectivity as receivers. Before 
the Web 2.0 era, when user-generated content (UGC) became a defining character, the 
public did not have many regular channels to influence news production other than the 
rare cases of calling or writing letters to newspapers and TV news programs. On SNSs, as 
discussed above, individual users can also be a medium. With the two-way information 
flow described above, the denotation of media has been largely broadened in the digital 
era.  
The agenda-setting theory is one of the most classic theories in media effect 
research connecting news and public opinion. Inspired by Lippman's (1922) thesis on 
how our cognitive maps of the world are determined by the pseudo-environment 
constructed by news media, the agenda-setting theory stresses that the salience of a given 
issue transfers from news media to the public (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Here, media 
agenda refers to the proportions of news coverage that different issues have, while public 
agenda is defined as the perceived issue importance in the public’s mind. Although a 
highly theoretically valuable theory, the predictive power of the agenda-setting setting 




been challenged by the new communication patterns introduced by SNSs in recent 
decades.  
The first assumption of the agenda-setting theory is a unified public agenda. 
McCombs (2004) has proposed an Acapulco typology — a four-part typology of 
perspectives of the agenda-setting theory. It divides the measurement of public salience 
into aggregate and individual data and categorizes the focus of the media agenda as the 
entire agenda and single item agenda. While the typology distinguishes between different 
levels of public agenda, it does not consider another factor that could further clarify the 
concept of the public agenda: the perceived audiences of the public opinion. Essentially, 
all opinions that we can collect are expressed opinions. While the intention of agenda-
setting researchers is to draw “the picture in our heads,” we must be aware that the public 
agenda, normally constructed by self-reported survey data, cannot be simply equated to 
individuals’ true thoughts. Individuals are still constrained by a major limitation of the 
survey method: when participants express their opinions with researchers as their 
perceived audience, they may be influenced by social desirability. Another way that we 
can observe public opinions is on SNSs, where people express themselves in a more 
complex social setting. Additionally, the public, if aware of the monitoring behaviors of 
the news media, may also strategically and selectively emphasize or contain their opinion 
expression, either independently or collectively, to shape the news agenda in their desired 
directions. As no previous literature has systematically examined the difference between 
the two versions of public agenda — what people report in a survey and what they post 




the two and explore the nuances behind the potential discrepancies. 
Second, the traditional agenda-setting theory also assumes a uniform news 
agenda. Early agenda-setting studies were normally conducted based on a manual content 
analysis of a few mainstream news media, such as the most studied New York Times 
(e.g., Althaus & Tewksbury, 2002; Winter & Eyal, 1981; Wu & Coleman, 2009). This 
theory and method combination was largely due to the limited capacity of human coding 
and the fact that few mainstream news media indeed dominated readership back then. 
With the proliferation of news outlets, intermedia agenda-setting — the phenomenon 
where news organizations observe each other to determine newsworthiness and thus 
follow each other’s agenda — came to our attention. Scholars have considered the 
differences between news organizations, yet still regarded the news agenda within a news 
organization as internally consistent, despite the proliferation of numerous distribution 
platforms. Earlier studies showed that the public agenda change caused by the printed 
version and online version of the same news outlet was different, which can be attributed 
to the technological features of websites (Althaus & Tewksbury, 2002). Within the digital 
news environment, however, less evidence is available as to how news agendas presented 
on news websites and news SNS accounts, the two major information sources for Internet 
users, differ from each other. Therefore, the second goal of this dissertation is to compare 
the two versions of the news agenda and reveal the factors behind the discrepancies.  
Lastly, the traditional agenda-setting theory describes a one-way salience transfer 
process from the media to the public, which, as explained above, may lack predictive 




general access to information, is not exclusively held by professional journalists 
anymore. The proliferation and equalization of gatekeepers to include members of the 
public makes it possible to observe a two-way agenda-setting process, in which the public 
agenda can reversely influence the media agenda. This reverse agenda-setting effect, 
which I borrow from opinion leader scholars (Brosius & Weimann, 1996), has theoretical 
roots in the agenda building and intermedia agenda-setting (IAS) literature. To answer 
the “who sets the media’s agenda” question, the former theory emphasizes how 
professional actors, such as organizations, interest groups, public relations, and political 
campaigns, can transfer their issue salience to news media (McCombs, 2014). IAS, as 
mentioned above, focuses on how news media are influenced by their peers. There has 
been some exploration on how public expression on SNSs can shape the media agenda 
under these two frameworks (e.g., Conway et al., 2015; Harder et al., 2017; Kim et al., 
2016; Melek, 2017). However, it is problematic to indistinguishably equate the ordinary 
SNSs users to professional organizations that have direct contact with the press or to 
regard social media as a unified medium. The reverse agenda-setting effect — issue 
salience transfer from the public to news media — deserves exclusive theorization and 
empirical tests. Accordingly, the third goal of this dissertation is to clarify the potential 
two-way agenda-setting directions and the influencing factors behind them. 
In sum, this dissertation aims to theorize a new multi-version two-way agenda-
setting framework with empirical evidence to improve the explanatory and predictive 
power of the agenda-setting theory. This framework incorporates three major theoretical 




agenda — one expressed in a more private survey and one expressed on (semi-)public 
social media platforms. Second, news media can also present two different versions of 
the agenda — one in the traditional forms and one selected to cater to the preferences of 
social media users and to fit with the platform affordances. Third, there should be two 
directions of agenda-setting effect — one from the media to the public (the traditional 
direction) and one from the public to the media (the “reverse agenda-setting” direction). 
Chapter 2 details the theoretical framework of this dissertation. 
I then empirically test the proposed theoretical framework by (1) analyzing the 
agendas from news media’s social media accounts and websites comparatively; (2) 
revealing the discrepancy of issue salience between self-reported data and actual social 
media expression; and (3) examining the impact of issue-, individual-, and media-levels 
of contingent variables on the direction and strength of the agenda-setting effect. The 
election periods are arguably the best time to observe information flows, as they are when 
all parties, including news media and the public, are most engaged in monitoring news 
and expressing opinions on social issues (McCombs, 2014). Taking the discussions 
around the 2020 US presidential election as an example, this study innovatively connects 
individual-level survey responses of 854 US adults and the corresponding individual 
tweets, in tandem with all website articles and news tweets published during the election 
period from 27 major US news organizations. The SNS Twitter was selected due to its 
wide use among both the public and the media in the US context, as well as its news-
friendly affordances. By juxtaposing the correlations (aggregate-level analyses) between 




relationships (issue-level analyses) between the timestamped SNS expressions and the 
news agenda, this dissertation also discusses the strengths and weaknesses of different 
techniques of measuring the agenda-setting effects. Chapter 3 reviews the research 
methods and procedures. 
Chapter 4 summarizes the research findings. Overall, the two versions of public 
agenda represented by survey and by social media expression do not transfer issue 
salience to each other at an aggregate level, and only have significant issue-level 
correspondence on two out of the 19 issues. The two versions of media agenda, however, 
showed strong overall correlation and mutual agenda-setting relationship on most issues 
in the time-series analyses. As for the reverse public-to-media agenda-setting 
relationships, a two-way pattern was indeed found, but with the traditional agenda-setting 
direction being much stronger than the reverse. If taking a closer look at the contingent 
factors, issue-wise comparison indicates that issues with higher obtrusiveness presented 
stronger two-way agenda-setting relationships. In other words, people are more likely to 
influence and be influenced by both news headlines and new tweets when the issues are 
directly relevant to their daily lives and issues that people have to rely on news media to 
know about. Additionally, news tweets, especially those from non-digital-native media, 
showed a slightly stronger mutual connection with the public agenda compared to digital-
native ones. As for media with different political orientations, while mainstream media 
have the strongest traditional agenda-setting power on both news websites and Twitter, 
conservative media were influenced by (i.e., reversely set by) the public agenda on more 




white, as well as having lower income, lower education level, lower opinion leadership, 
and lower social capital, were more likely to be influenced by the media agendas. In sum, 
the results empirically present an imbalanced two-way agenda-setting pattern as 
hypothesized. 
Chapter 5 provides discussion on the contributions and implications of this 
dissertation. In short, this contributes to the agenda-setting scholarship both theoretically 
and methodologically. Theoretically, it expands the traditional conceptualization of 
media and public agendas to better represent the complexity of digital information flows 
nowadays. Proposing a cross-platform two-way theoretical map, the current study 
challenges the one-way agenda-setting assumption by connecting media effects, public 
opinion, and civic engagement literature. Methodologically, the study builds upon 
agenda-setting’s tradition of connecting survey and content analysis, and further 
innovatively introduces an approach matching survey responses and the corresponding 
social media expression. By connecting and comparing what people think through a 
survey and what they tweet, we will be able to illustrate more complete information flows 
and to explore multi-level factors, including individual behaviors, that drive the flows in 
the digital era. Ultimately, this study provides normative implications for participatory 
democracy by revealing a longer-term and subtle version of civic engagement: If the 
public gains the ability to strategically construct and promote the desired version of 
public agenda to news media, they can not only engage in the existing discussion of 
social issues, but also decide what to discuss through the potential two-way agenda-




policy changes, just like the more aggressive routes of grassroots social movements. 
Nevertheless, this reverse agenda-setting power could be seized by some members of the 
public or controlled by polarized opinions. Thus, studying the mechanism is necessary for 
us to understand potential biases and accordingly design civic infrastructure that 





CHAPTER 2 Theoretical Background and Literature Review 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the theoretical background and a review of 
the past empirical works for the three main questions of this dissertation work. I first 
introduce the traditional agenda-setting theory and the three assumptions that are 
challenged by the current digital media environment. The second and third section then 
offer elaboration on why and how we should expect two versions of the public and media 
agenda respectively. In the fourth section, I propose a two-way agenda-setting 
mechanism with theoretical support rooted in recent extensions of the agenda-setting 
theory. This chapter ends with a comprehensive literature review of the empirical 
evidence of two-way agenda-setting and of the potential contingent factors drawn from 
previous literature.  
2.1. Agenda-setting Theory: Basic Assumptions and Challenges  
Agenda-setting theory is one of the most classic and widely applied media effects 
theories in the communication area. The original agenda-setting theory, which describes 
how issue salience transfers from news media to the public, was coined by McCombs and 
Shaw (1972) through their famous Chapel Hill study. The theory was inspired by 
Lippmann (1922)’s idea of “the world outside and the pictures in our heads” and 
emphasizes that the public, who do not have direct experience with what is happening in 
the world, live in a pseudo-environment constructed by the media. Here, the media 
agenda normally refers to the relative amount of news coverage on each public issue and 
the public agenda is traditionally defined as the relative issue importance in the public’s 




proposition of media’s agenda-setting effect is important as, after the early stages of 
media effects studies--including the strong effects (“hypodermic needle”) stage from 
1900s to 1930s and the limited effects stage from 1940s to 1960s--it brought media 
effects studies back to a more scientific strong effects stage by elaborating on the 
mechanism behind media effects. The theory stresses that media may not be able to 
decide what we think, but what we think about (Lowery & DeFleur, 1995; McCombs, 
2004). 
After almost 50 years of development, agenda-setting research has gone beyond 
“what to think about” to “what to think” and “how to think about.” The extensions of the 
issue-level agenda-setting (first level) include attribute-level agenda-setting (second 
level) and network agenda-setting (third level) etc. The first-level agenda-setting focuses 
on the transfer of salience of general issues, such as economy and crime, from the media 
to the public agenda, whereas the second-level agenda-setting takes a step further to 
examine issue attributes, which could be substantive attributes (e.g., personality and 
ideology) or affective attributes (i.e., positive, neutral, or negative; Wu & Coleman, 
2009). The third level of agenda-setting was developed based on the fact that people’s 
mental presentations are constructed pictorially in a networked way. It assumes that the 
interrelationship among objects or attributes, not just the discrete salience of the 
elements, will transfer from the media to the public (Guo, 2016). This dissertation will 
start by focusing on the issue-level agenda-setting, as the diverse and short SNS posts 
published by both the public and the media are less likely to contain sufficient and 




traditionally studied long news articles/TV programs.  
Additionally, as McCombs et al. (2014) and Shaw et al. (2019) summarized, the 
large family of agenda-setting research looks at not only the three levels of agenda-
setting effects, but also (1) the psychology of agenda-setting, primarily the core concept 
of need for orientation among the individual members of the public; (2) the consequences 
of agenda-setting, which focuses on the public’s behavioral outcomes such as voting; and 
(3) the origin of the media agenda, which includes “the prevailing cultural and 
ideological environment to news sources, the influence of the media on each other, the 
norms and routines of journalism, and the individual characteristics of journalists” (p. 
782). The last type of extension is particularly relevant to the current study, as one of my 
goals, as mentioned above, is to explore the public agenda as one origin of the media 
agenda. Although the agenda building and the intermedia agenda-setting theory have 
provided adequate discussions on how professional organizations and other media shape 
a media outlet’s agenda respectively, the role of the public, as represented on SNSs, in 
constructing the media agenda has not been systematically examined. Thus, this study 
will fill this gap to complete the answer of “who sets the media’s agenda.” Section 2.4 
will provide more detailed discussion on this reverse effect. 
With the emergence of Web2.0 and the largely increased visibility of UGC, some 
basic assumptions of the agenda-setting theory have been challenged. As discussed 
above, the prevalence of SNSs has changed both sides of the agenda-setting process — 
the media and the public (Messner et al., 2012; Peil & Sparviero, 2017; Shearer, 2018; 




assumptions of the agenda-setting theory.  
First, news media were relatively homogenous in terms of issue coverage back to 
the days when agenda-setting theory was first put forward. The public, back to the 1970s, 
read or watched a similar and limited set of newspapers and TV news programs. In the 
first 20 years of agenda-setting research, most empirical studies only did content analysis 
of the products from a few news organizations, including the New York Times (e.g., 
Althaus & Tewksbury, 2002; Golan, 2006), the Washington Post (e.g., Gilberg et al., 
1980; Miller et al., 1998), and TV news programs on major networks or cable channels 
including ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, and Fox News (e.g., Wu & Coleman, 2009). After 
almost 50 years, the news landscape in America and worldwide has been dramatically 
diversified, in terms of both cross-media and cross-platform variations. In terms of cross-
media variations, many news media in recent decades have started to serve niche markets 
and provide different media agendas (Stroud, 2011). For instance, although controversy 
exists around whether it is the more polarized public that leads to more polarized media 
or the reverse, in the US we indeed witness a wider gap between the news agenda 
provided by liberal and conservative media in the recent decades (Prior, 2013). This 
change was addressed in the agenda-melding theory, which differentiated vertical media 
— media that are public, mass-oriented, and factual — and horizontal media, opinion-
oriented media that serve specific interests (Shaw et al., 2019).  
On the other hand, only limited research systematically discussed the other type 
of variation that challenges the unified media environment assumption of agenda-setting 




organization influence content. The 1990s saw the start of the digitalization trend of news 
media (Peil & Sparviero, 2017), in which news organizations began to distribute news on 
various digital platforms. During the digitalization process, news organizations are 
encouraged or even forced to adapt to platform affordances, such as the 280-character 
limit of Twitter. The disparity in agenda-setting effects of two most significant digital 
channels — website and social media — remains far from being adequately discussed. 
Although previous research looked at intermedia agenda-setting across publishing 
platforms with different affordances (Harder et al., 2017), the within-media differences, 
that is, how the same news organization presents different versions of the news agenda on 
various digital platforms, have hardly been addressed. Therefore, the first theme of this 
paper is to explore how news agendas from the same news organizations differ across 
platforms.  
Second, the traditional agenda-setting theory assumes a unified public agenda, 
which is defined as the concerns of the public (McCombs, 2004). Prior to the social 
media era, public opinion was normally measured using a survey method. Thus, the 
public agenda in the earlier agenda-setting studies was operationalized as either the 
perceived issue importance rating in close-ended “Most Important Problem (MIP)” 
questions, or the number of occurrences in open-ended questions. In recent years, more 
and more academic research (e.g., Araujo & van der Meer, 2020; Ceron et al., 2016) and 
professional news organizations (e.g., McGregor, 2019; Paulussen & Harder, 2014) have 
used issue salience patterns extracted from SNSs to represent the public agenda. While 




misinterpretation of the question wording, lack of attention, social desirability, intentional 
deception, etc. (Bishop, 2004; Glynn et al., 2015; Schuman & Scott, 1987), scholars also 
argue that using social media data to exemplify the public agenda may be problematic 
due to problems such as low representativeness, the existence of “lurkers,” difficulty in 
identifying political opinion, self-censorship, etc. (boyd & Crawford, 2012; Murphy et 
al., 2014; Salleh, 2017). Arguing which version of the public agenda better represents the 
“true” public opinion is more of a philosophical issue. The more practical route, I argue, 
would be to theoretically and empirically compare the differences between the two so as 
to approach the “true public agenda” from two sides. Section 2.2 will detail the 
theoretical thesis.  
Third, the agenda-setting process is hardly unidirectional from the media to the 
public. We are currently in a hybrid media system where various actors, including both 
the mass media and the public, are involved in shaping the information flows in a many-
to-many self-communication mode, instead of the traditional one-to-many mass 
communication mode (Castells, 2007; Chadwick, 2017). Both the media and the public 
can be message senders and receivers. Thus, while most agenda-setting studies focused 
on one-way mass media effects — how the products of traditional and professional news 
organizations transfer issues salience to the public — or examined the reverse impact of 
public agenda under the traditional intermedia agenda-setting framework, I argue here 
that we should treat the public agenda and the mass media agenda as different yet 
connected elements and examine effects around both directions. Section 2.3 will 




In this light, the above three aspects of the agenda-setting research should be 
updated. First, the media agenda afforded by different digital platforms should be 
carefully distinguished. Second, the agenda-setting effects between the media agenda and 
the public agenda represented by two forms — self-reported issue importance and 
spontaneous SNSs expression — should be juxtaposed. Potential factors behind their 
differences should also be examined. Third, the traditional one-way agenda-setting 
assumption should be revisited and replaced by an exploration of two-way agenda-setting 
relationships among the two versions of public agenda and two versions of media agenda. 
Accordingly, I expand the traditional single-version one-way agenda-setting theory to a 
multi-version two-way agenda-setting framework (see Figure 2.1). The following 
sections will elaborate on each of the updates in turn. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Theoretical map of the multi-version two-way agenda-setting framework. 
Note. The unidirectional arrows indicate agenda-setting effects and the bidirectional arrows 





2.2. Two Versions of Public Agenda 
2.2.1. Conceptualization and Operationalization of Public Opinions 
While the goal of the original agenda-setting theory was to address the 
relationship between mass media coverage and public opinion, the two key concepts have 
been conceptualized and operationalized in distinct ways.  
First of all, we cannot examine the public agenda without discussing public 
opinion research. While public opinion is a widely used term, the theoretical 
conceptualization of public opinion is not unidimensional. One argument loosely defines 
public opinion as “what the public think” (Glynn et al., 2015). In this view, public 
opinion is regarded as a socially constructed concept, whose meaning is contingent on the 
collective impact of “the social climate, technological milieu, and communication 
environment” (Herbst, 1998, p. 2). Nevertheless, an alternative understanding of public 
opinion defines it as “what people typically think” or “what the public express” (Allport, 
1937; Lippmann, 1922). Researchers such as Noelle-Neumann (1993), who revealed that 
people will conditionally and selectively express their true opinion based on the social 
environment with the spiral of silence theory, have abandoned the idea of digging into 
people’s inner minds. She defined public opinion as “opinions on controversial issues 
that one expresses in public without isolating oneself” (Noelle-Neumann, 1993, p. 63). 
This definition takes the context of one’s expression into consideration (after all, we will 
never know unexpressed opinions), and recognizes that in reality, other people will 
understand the social phenomenon by monitoring the expressed opinion. 




techniques. For decades, survey techniques have been the most important and almost the 
only way for researchers and journalists to represent what was regarded as important 
among the public. Yet, doubts about this self-reported method of measuring public 
opinion have never been dispelled. Problems raised include sampling biases, low 
response rate, misinterpretation of the question wording, lack of attention, social 
desirability, intentional deception, etc. (Bishop, 2004; Glynn et al., 2015; Schuman & 
Scott, 1987). As Glynn et al. (2015) concluded, equating survey results alone to public 
opinion is “to miss most of the story” (p. 4).  
The limitations due to the artificial nature of the survey method can be largely 
solved by using social media data to represent public opinion. The ubiquity of social 
media use among the general public and their instant expression have driven public 
opinion research to “enter a new era” (Murphy et al., 2014, p. 789). The high data quality, 
cost efficiency, as well as timeliness afforded by social media data, are highly attractive 
to communication professionals, including journalists who once needed to go on the 
streets for Vox Populi (Murphy et al., 2014).  
This trend also has its theoretical roots. On the one hand, if public opinion is 
defined as the collective thoughts of a number of people (Allport, 1937; Lippman, 1922), 
the sheer large number of individuals that can be captured by social media data alone 
makes this method overweigh the number of individuals that can be included in a survey, 
which has been criticized as manufacturing a “public” with what are actually individual 
opinions (Blumler, 1979). On the other hand, social media, especially public or semi-




Noelle-Neumann’s original study — a social environment where everyone is monitoring 
and being monitored — and thus become an even more desirable channel to collect 
public opinion under the second definition.  
Nevertheless, social media data are by no means the perfect representation of 
public opinion. Above all, it is irrational to assume that everyone is online. Although 
social media penetration rate has been increasing each year, 28% of US adults still do not 
use any types of social media in 2019, and only 22% of the population uses Twitter, 
arguably the most commonly used reference in public opinion research in the US (Pew 
Research Center, 2019). Even among those who use social media frequently, 38% of 
them have never expressed political opinions on social media (Duggan & Smith, 2016). 
With the existence of non-users and “lurkers,” the silent users of SNSs, we can only say 
that social media data provide another version of public opinion (Lomborg & Bechmann, 
2014). Different from survey responses that were collected independently, social media 
users interact with individual and organizational accounts and express to specific target 
audiences to construct their networked identity (Papacharissi, 2013). Whether the users 
choose to express on political issues and the emotion in those expressions are largely 
shaped by other actors, especially their close contacts (Bond et al., 2012; Kramer et al., 
2014). Thus, we are more likely to observe “herd mentality” in social media expression 
than in survey responses. In short, this version of the public agenda, different from the 
private, individual, representative, and measurable version constructed by surveys, is 
more public, relational, hierarchical, and also measurable (McGregor, 2019). There is no 





Specific to agenda-setting studies, the public agenda was considered as a subset of 
public opinion — what people are concerned about. Following the two definitions and 
operationalizations, we could expect two versions of public agenda: One that reflects 
what people self-reported in a survey privately and one that people expressed in a public 
or semi-public social environment. Corresponding to the first version, traditional agenda-
setting research often measures public opinion, either at an aggregate or individual level, 
through self-reported survey questions. The respondents were asked either to name a list 
of most important issues/attributes (McCombs, 2014) and/or to draw connections 
between different attributes (“the mind-mapping approach”; Guo, 2014). In recent years, 
issue salience found in social media data has entered agenda-setting studies as an 
operationalization of public agenda (e.g., Avendaño, 2010; Chen et al., 2019; Conway-
Silva et al., 2018). To date, however, no systematic comparison has been conducted to 
explore the impacts of using these two versions of public agenda in agenda-setting 
studies. Therefore, I ask: 
RQ1. Is the public agenda reflected by individuals’ self-reported issue importance 
different from the relative issue prominence expressed on social media during the 
2020 US presidential election? 
2.2.2. Contingent Factors of the Difference  
A following question will be, if differences exist, what factors contribute to the 
discrepancies between the two versions of public agenda? Two types of factors are 




mentioned above, samples drawn from those who are vocal on SNSs cannot represent the 
entire population. Previous studies have comprehensively discussed the sampling biases 
in SNS data. For instance, Hargittai (2020) found that social media users tend to have 
higher socioeconomic status and better Internet skills compared to the general public, 
which could lead to oversampling of people with these characteristics. Other scholars 
also warned about platform-specific sampling problems (e.g., the filtering strategies of 
data streams), platform design and moderation, as well as distortion from activities of 
nonhuman accounts (Gillespie, 2018; Ruths & Pfeffer, 2014). These problems can be 
partly solved by using “fire hose,” which provides full access to social media data, 
instead of the public version of Application Programming Interfaces (APIs; Lomborg & 
Bechmann, 2014) and by utilizing bot detection tools (e.g., Botometer; 
Sayyadiharikandeh et al., 2020). Shah et al. (2015) also pointed out that a survey, 
especially low-response-rate ones, still provides a biased sample of public opinion. 
Various statistical methods can also be applied to adjust for the biases as long as the 
researchers are aware of them. Thus, this factor is not the main focus of this dissertation. 
If given the same population, the more important factor behind the potential 
discrepancies between the two versions of the public agenda, then, is individuals’ self-
censorship of content. Self-censorship, a type of non-participation, can be loosely defined 
as the withholding of one's real opinions in a social setting (Hayes et al., 2006a). It has 
two characteristics: First, self-censorship is a conscious choice even when someone has 
the opportunity to speak. Second, it happens due to covert pressure or threat, especially 




(Hayes et al., 2005b; Lutz & Hoffmann, 2017). Building upon the spiral of silence theory, 
Hayes et al. (2005a) conceptualized self-censorship as an individual difference, which is 
related to high anxiety about social interaction high concern about other people’s 
evaluation, low argumentativeness, and low self-esteem.  
Self-censorship has been closely tied to political expression and is an especially 
harmful reason behind the potential difference between what people will disclose in an 
anonymous survey and in a traceable social media post. Previous scholars have 
empirically demonstrated that people with a high tendency toward self-censorship are 
more likely to repress their political expression even if they have an opinion (Gearhart & 
Zhang, 2014; Hayes et al., 2006b). Thus, when members of the general public have 
different levels of willingness to self-censor, some opinions may be disproportionately 
suppressed, leading to a biased representation of public opinion observed only on social 
media. Self-censorship differences among individuals can result in more covert and hard-
to-adjust biases than the other factors mentioned above. People with high willingness to 
self-censor will be more sensitive to the surrounding opinion environment and be more 
likely to express following the others, which may widen the gap between what they 
report in a survey independently and what they express on social media with more social 
pressure. 
Although self-censorship is often conceptualized in small group settings, it also 
applies to understanding the gap between forming an opinion and posting on SNSs. High 
self-censorship, based on the previous literature, could lead to a series of behaviors on 




minute” deletion of typed content before posting (Das & Kramer, 2013), or even altering 
the way of expression to one that is different from one’s original intended way (Madsen 
& Verhoeven, 2016). Thus, we should examine individual differences in the tendency 
toward self-censorship as a moderator in the comparison between self-reported perceived 
issue importance — the self-reported version of public agenda measured by survey — 
and the actual SNSs expression — the version of public agenda that appears online. More 
specifically, we can expect lower alignment between the two versions of agenda among 
people with high self-censorship. Thus, I propose this hypothesis: 
H1. People with higher willingness to self-censor will have larger discrepancies 
between their perceived importance and social media expression about social 
issues during the 2020 US presidential election. 
2.3. Two Versions of Media Agenda   
2.3.1. The Digitalization of News Media and the Two Platforms 
As briefly mentioned above, the diversification of digital platforms has witnessed 
the emergence of two forms of news media that are interconnected yet different. The 
trend of media convergence, a buzzword describing the blurred boundary and increased 
connectivity between media forms, since the 1980s has encouraged traditional news 
media to adopt a plurality of media formats, especially digital ones (Peil & Sparviero, 
2017). Most news media, especially newspapers, have become multiplatform enterprises 
(Ju et al., 2014). According to a 2020 survey, 86% of US adults received their news from 
digital devices. It is not surprising that major news organizations have migrated to digital 




Since the late 2000s, especially after the launch of Twitter as a “breaking news 
disruptor” (Elizabeth, 2017), major US media organizations have started to expand their 
online presence to SNSs. Many hired specialized social media editors, who not only 
transfer the website news to a more SNS-friendly format, but also create content that can 
engage readers and citizen journalists (Gleason, 2010; Ju et al., 2014). In the early stage, 
newsrooms put their SNS accounts in a secondary position. They even regarded posting 
information on SNSs before the news article was published as “scooping themselves.” 
After more than a decade, however, SNSs have driven so much traffic for news 
organizations that most of them now have a social media team, not just several editors, to 
engage SNS audiences (Elizabeth, 2017).  
Thus, while news websites largely replicate the content from the more traditional 
forms (e.g., newspaper, television, and radio), the social media accounts of news 
organizations curate a different agenda due to audiences’ characteristics and platform 
affordances. Although some news organizations simply post links to drive traffic to their 
websites or use automatic tools to indiscriminately duplicate web news, previous studies 
also revealed that many news media tend to create content specific to social media 
platforms and have a distinctive news agenda on Twitter (Armstrong & Gao, 2010; 
Palser, 2009). Among the 200-500 long articles posted on news websites per day, the 
social media team has to select 50-100 that fit the SNS users’ interests more. The media 
agenda reflected on Twitter may also be confined largely by the platform’s affordances 
(boyd & Ellison, 2007; Bucher & Helmond, 2017; Gillespie, 2018). For instance, news 




editorial articles, to match with the timeliness expectation of Twitter users and to fit into 
the 280-character limit of the platform. Zhang and Guo (2019) also illustrated that people 
consuming news on two SNSs — Weibo and WeChat — even from the same news 
source, had different levels of satisfaction with the government, which implied that the 
same source may present a very distinctive agenda on different digital platforms. Thus, I 
ask this research question: 
RQ2. Is the media agenda reflected by news coverage on media’s websites 
different from the one represented in media’s social media posts during the 2020 
US presidential election? 
2.3.2. Contingent Factors of the Difference 
Additionally, the characteristics of news organizations may serve as contingent 
factors of the discrepancies between the two versions of media agenda. Stromback and 
Kiousis (2010) showed that media channels and type will influence the general and 
specific news consumption of the public. Specifically, digital-native media, media that 
were created on the web and almost solely publish online (Barthel & Shearer, 2015), tend 
to be early adopters of new digital technologies (Nee, 2013). Their deeper 
experimentation with more concise and multimedia storytelling may also make their 
content more transferrable to SNS publishing than their non-native counterparts (Harbers, 
2016). Also, online-only media were found to focus more on timeliness (Harder et al., 
2017) and thus may have a smaller time lag between publication on their website and on 
SNS than those still following a more traditional publishing routine. A survey conducted 




legacy newsrooms, the culture is to predominantly focus on the traditional forms, leaving 
the social media teams with a feeling of being “removed from day-to-day journalism,” 
whereas the two parts may have more organic connections for media built on digital 
platforms (Elizabeth, 2017). Thus, we could expect that media type (i.e., whether a media 
outlet is digital native) will influence the discrepancies between the two versions of 
media agenda. Therefore, this study hypothesizes: 
H2. Compared to non-digital-native media, digital-native media will have a closer 
alignment between the agenda presented on their news websites and Twitter 
accounts during the 2020 US presidential election. 
2.4. Towards a Two-way Agenda-setting Process 
While the traditional agenda-setting theory describes how the salience of a given 
issue transfers from news media to the public (McCombs & Shaw, 1972), the emergence 
of social media also arouses discussions on how the agenda-setting power is shifting from 
traditional news organizations to ordinary people. As Chaffee and Metzger (2001) 
argued, “the key problem for agenda-setting theory will change from what issues the 
media tell people to think about to what issues people tell the media they want to think 
about” (p. 375). In the recent decade, social media has become the major channel for 
people to “tell what they want to think about.”  
The emergence of social media also has the potential to transfer “media power” to 
“people’s power.” “Media power” can be loosely defined as the non-coercive bargaining 
power that mass media can use to influence powerful actors in society (Couldry & 




passive receivers of the frames set by news media. Nevertheless, the low entry threshold 
and interactive nature of social media enable the once silent mass to actively speak for 
themselves and to reversely have more control over the greater discourse. This leads to a 
growing literature calling for a new theorization of the “people’s power.” A seminal 
study by Meraz (2009) found that traditional elite media’s monopoly of agenda-setting 
power is being challenged by independent blog platforms. More empirical studies 
emerged soon after and expanded the discussion to more platforms beyond blogs (e.g., 
(Jones-Jang et al., 2020; Melek, 2017; Neuman et al., 2014; Van den Heijkant et al., 
2019).  
2.4.1. Empirical Evidence of the Two-way Directions  
Based on the preliminary systematic literature review, I found that 17 of the 30 
papers examining the agenda-setting relationship between traditional news media and 
social media showed a reciprocal or bi-directional relationship between social media and 
traditional media (Zhang, 2020a). Among the 10 studies that quantitatively compared the 
strength of the agenda-setting effects in the two directions, the traditional agenda-setting 
effect (traditional media → social media) was found to be stronger in four studies, while 
six studies supported a stronger reverse agenda-setting effect (social media → traditional 
media). This indicates that the one-directional agenda-setting effect may not hold 
nowadays in all contexts. 
Despite the empirical evidence, the theoretical framework of a two-way agenda-
setting effect remains unclear. First, social media was often treated as a unified 




different types of social media accounts should be carefully distinguished when studying 
information flow and media effects. Previous studies, nevertheless, went to two extremes: 
Some studies treated social media as a part of the traditional media ecology and analyzed 
the agenda-setting effect under the frame of intermedia agenda-setting (e.g., Conway et 
al., 2015; Harder et al., 2017; Kim et al., 2016; Melek, 2017), which ignored the 
expressions of ordinary users. Others, although they regarded social media expression as 
a proxy of public opinion, approached the relationships from a perspective of 
collective/connective actions or citizen journalism and did not connect it with media 
agenda (e.g., Freelon et al., 2016; Meraz, 2009; Quinn et al., 2019). Also, the terms 
referring to the agenda-setting power of social media discussion are varied: e.g., social 
media’s intermedia agenda-setting effect in Harder et al. (2017), social media power in 
Freelon et al. (2016) and agenda trending in Groshek and Groshek (2013), which requires 
systematic comparison and explication.  
Thus, this dissertation aims to disentangle public opinion from miscellaneous 
social media data and clarify the terminology by re-introducing the term “reverse agenda-
setting.” Reverse agenda-setting was first mentioned by opinion leader scholars. For 
instance, Brosius and Weimann (1996) proposed a reverse agenda-setting model, in 
which “early recognizers” — people with high strength of personality (SP) — set public 
agenda and media agenda. The term has not been actively studied for years since then and 
was employed to name other effects (e.g., media intentionally remain silent on some 
issues; Haarsager, 1991). Nevertheless, the core idea of examining the social influence of 




The seminal paper of Bennett and Iyengar (2008) argued that the current media landscape 
has created a new era of minimal effects, in which audiences become more engaged and 
have more channels to pass their preferences to journalists. Therefore, Ragas et al. (2014) 
advocated that it is time to revisit reverse agenda-setting — the process when the public 
sets the media agenda. Their empirical results, although using online search behavior to 
represent public agenda, added evidence to a plausible reciprocal agenda-setting pattern. 
2.4.2. Theoretical Roots 
In addition to the empirical evidence above, there are several theoretical and 
practical reasons supporting the potential two-way agenda-setting effect emerging in 
recent years. Theoretically, the reverse agenda-setting process has been hinted at in the 
original agenda-setting theory and intermedia agenda-setting theory. McCombs (2014), 
when explaining the agenda-building process (i.e., who set the media’s agenda), 
mentioned three sources: major information sources, other media, and journalism norms. 
When talking about the first one, he stated that journalists can hardly cover every corner 
of the world and thus need secondary information from professional organizations, 
interest groups, public relation specialists, government officials, and experts, etc. 
(McCombs, 2014). For instance, based on an in-depth interview with political journalists, 
Parmelee (2014) found that tweets from political leaders had first- and second-level 
agenda-building power. This study also indicated that newsrooms refer to political 
leaders' tweets to find missed events, get quotes, polling data, viewpoints, background 
information, and double-check information.  




the public, who is arguably the most familiar with daily incidents around them. Returning 
to the original thread of agenda-setting theory, we can see that it was the lack of 
capability to be directly informed about “the world outside” that drives us to live in the 
media’s “pseudo-environment” (Lippman, 1922). Therefore, if individual citizens can 
serve as direct information sources and bypass the mediation of the institutionalized 
agenda builders, the traditional direction of agenda-setting should be hypothetically 
reciprocal or even reverse only. Qualitative studies on journalists (e.g., Lariscy et al., 
2009; McGregor, 2019) have revealed that social media were actively used as quick 
sources to get reporting ideas and find information. Yet, as argued above, if we carefully 
distinguish different information sources on social media, we should not arbitrarily label 
all information-gathering efforts of journalists from social media as agenda-building. 
Ordinary citizens’ posts might be evaluated and utilized very differently compared to 
professional actors, such as organizations and political figures.  
Additionally, although some previous literature defines social media as a type of 
media and analyzed social media public agenda under the IAS framework (e.g., Conway 
et al., 2015; Groshek & Groshek, 2013), we should carefully distinguish between IAS 
and the reverse agenda-setting process. The logic behind the IAS theory is that journalists 
routinely observe and copy their peers to validate their judgment on the newsworthiness 
of events (McCombs, 2014). However, the public cannot be the substitute of professional 
journalists in this formula: news media refer to the public agenda not for news 
professionalism, but for a better understanding of potential readership. On SNSs, 




showed, journalists use social media for various purposes, including monitoring other 
journalists, which falls into the intermedia agenda-setting framework, and representing 
the public or determining public opinion, which refers to what I emphasize here as a 
reverse agenda-setting process. In sum, it is theoretically necessary to discuss the process 
of issue salience transfer from the public to the media outside of the agenda building and 
IAS theories and to propose a new two-way agenda-setting framework. 
2.4.3. Practical Reasons 
Practically, the media ecology has been dramatically changed with the emergence 
of Web 2.0, where UGC has become a key characteristic. Social media, including Twitter 
and the blogs mentioned above, brought opportunities and radical change to the way we 
communicate, think, and act. First, the technological features of Web 2.0 bring us “big 
data,” which, on the one hand, point to the exponentially increasing data created by the 
general public, and, on the other hand, enhance journalists’ ability to monitor, collect, and 
analyze social media as public opinion (body & Crawford, 2012; McGregor, 2019). 
Journalists’ usage of the public as information sources goes beyond Vox Populi (Lukito 
et al., 2020) and to a more general and comprehensive understanding of what people 
value. As Weaver and Willnat (2020) revealed, a large number of journalists are actively 
using social media as information-gathering tools, especially to look for breaking events. 
The specialized social media editors will also use SNSs to connect with potential sources, 
understand the culture about how to attract more traffic on SNSs, and monitor “what’s 
being talked about, what’s trending, what’s hot” on social networks (Gleason, 2010). In 




SNSs to decide their coverage. 
Second, the increasing commercialization and fragmentation of news media 
requires them to better cater to their audiences (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008). Similarly, this 
shift has been strengthened by the increasing polarization and selective exposure among 
not only Americans but also people around the world (Sears & Freeman, 1967). In a UK 
study, van der Pas et al. (2017) argued that the media is trying to connect with their 
audiences through partisanship so as to better reflect on the frames that the partisan 
audiences are attracted to.  
Finally, the emergence of SNSs has cultivated a participatory culture, which 
encourages citizens to play a role beyond positive message receivers (Jenkins, 2006). 
Building upon the technological architecture mentioned above that enables real-time and 
easy access to disseminate information or express opinions, citizens can contribute to the 
news flows through multiple methods. First of all, we have witnessed the prevalence of 
citizen journalism or participatory journalism, which refer to news content created by 
non-professionals (Wall, 2015). This trend has motivated professional journalists to 
provide extensive training and even to collaborate with citizen journalists, which 
improves the quality of citizen journalism and further encourages this culture (Hermida, 
2012). Newman (2009) even argued that with the nearly real-time news reporting among 
citizens on SNSs, professional organizations have already “abandon[ed] attempts to be 
first for breaking news, focusing instead on being the best at verifying and curating it.” 
Thus, we could expect a two-way information flow: The news media pick up breaking 




news content on certain events.  
Importantly, the interactive nature of SNSs enables users to engage in 
professionally produced news in various ways, including sharing, commenting, liking, 
and even contacting the author(s)/editor(s) directly. Early scholars like Katz and 
Lazarsfeld (1995) stressed the importance of interpersonal communication, which 
describes how information can flow in interpersonal networks. Communication through 
social media arguably imitates interpersonal, unmediated interaction more than mass 
media (boyd & Ellison, 2007). In the social media era, it is even more common that a 
piece of breaking news has spread across millions of ordinary users before it is noticed by 
professional news organizations. The network effects can further enhance the potential 
reverse agenda-setting process. Messing and Westwood (2012) proved that social 
endorsement can sometimes be a stronger heuristic then some traditional ones, such as 
content type, sources, and partisan alignment. Thus, ordinary users could either 
contribute to the content by adding comments or highlight the importance of certain 
issues by providing endorsement (e.g., like the post). Based on the above theoretical and 
empirical support, I propose the following hypotheses and research question to examine 
(1) the existence of the traditional agenda-setting effect, (2) the existence of two-way 
agenda-setting relationships; and (3) the comparative strength of the two directions: 
H3a-b. The traditional agenda-setting effect (i.e., the news agenda will transfer to 
the public agenda as reflected by individuals’ self-reported issue importance) still 
stands for both (a) media agenda on news websites and (b) media agenda on 




H4a-b. There is a two-way agenda-setting effect between public agenda 
expressed on social media and (a) media agenda on news websites and (b) media 
agenda on social media during the 2020 US presidential election.  
RQ3. Between the reverse agenda-setting effect and the traditional agenda-setting 
effect, which direction will be stronger during the 2020 US presidential election? 
In addition, given that news websites and news social media accounts may present 
different agendas, they are likely to have distinctive agenda-setting relationships with the 
public agenda. Since no existing studies have empirically compared the two pairs of two-
way agenda-setting effects, I ask this research question: 
RQ4. Will the two-way agenda-setting effect be stronger or weaker between 
individuals’ social media expression and media’s social media posts, compared to 
the relationship between individuals’ social media expression and media agenda 
on their websites, during the 2020 US presidential election? 
2.3.4. Contingent Factors 
Finally, several factors have been revealed to intervene in the agenda-setting 
direction and strength between social media and traditional news media. Previous 
literature examining this has discussed a vast number of issue characteristics, including 
whether an issue is more or less “commentable,” more or less thought-provoking, more 
or less dramatic, conflict-laden and volatile, with a shorter- or longer-time frame, more 
domestic related or foreign related, and whether an issue fits news values or not (Araujo 
& van der Meer, 2020; Meraz, 2011a, Neuman et al., Rogstad, 2016; 2014; Sormanen et 




the traditional agenda-setting research - issue obtrusiveness - has not yet been tested in 
the reverse direction. Issue obtrusiveness refers to the extent to which an issue obtrudes 
into people’s daily life so that people can directly experience it without consuming news 
media (McCombs, 2014). Proposed by Zucker (1978), it is arguably the most examined 
issue attribute in agenda-setting studies (Soroka, 2002).  
Previous empirical results revealed conflicting directions of the impact. Some 
scholars argued for a stronger agenda-setting effect for high obtrusive issues due to the 
cognitive priming effect of direct experience (i.e., people will pay more attention to news 
that are relevant to their daily lives; Chen, 2009). Others found a lower level of 
correspondence between the public and the media agenda for high obtrusive issues, as 
people already have sufficient personal experience about those issues and thus do not 
need to rely on news media as their primary source of information (i.e., have lower need 
for orientation; McCombs, 2014; Weaver et al., 1981; Winter et al., 1982). As for the 
reverse direction, along the same line, I propose that the media will follow the public 
agenda more closely on high obtrusive issues, since those are issues with which people 
share more personal experience. Thus, this dissertation will test both directions with the 
following hypothesis: 
H5. Issue obtrusiveness will influence the direction and strength of the two-way 
agenda-setting effect. 
Beyond the issue-level factors, previous agenda-setting studies have explored the 
effects of different media’s characteristics as contingent factors in the potential two-way 




or independent (Han et al., 2017), whether government-controlled or commercial-
oriented (in an authoritarian context; Luo, 2014), elite or less elite, team blogging or not 
(Meraz, 2011b), and so on. News media’s online traffic and reporting style were also 
found to play a role in affecting the agenda-setting effect (Ragas et al., 2014). Adding to 
the existing studies, this study investigates the influence of two additional factors - media 
type (i.e., whether they are digital-native) and the media's political orientation. 
First, whether a news organization is digital-native largely influences their 
newsroom activities and public impact. On the one hand, we could expect the websites of 
non-digital-native media, which normally have a longer history and more established 
reputation, to have stronger traditional agenda-setting effects due to their eliteness in 
general. On the other hand, their digital-native counterparts may follow the public agenda 
more closely. Digital-native media are early adopters of new digital platforms, such as 
SNSs, and are more familiar with the culture (Nee, 2013; Harbers, 2016). Their focus on 
timeliness also encourages them to observe what is going on among social networks 
constantly. Elizabeth (2017) also revealed that legacy print-based newsrooms (i.e., non-
digital-native media) still pay relatively more attention to traditional reporting and tend to 
overlook the social media team, which may weaken the strength of both types of agenda-
setting effects between their social media accounts and the public agenda.  
Additionally, considering the media system in the US, media’s political 
orientation also plays an important role in the agenda-setting process. Several studies 
(e.g., Camaj, 2014; Chen et al., 2020; Guo et al., 2021) empirically showed the existence 




whether the media outlet is liberal, conservative, or mainstream. While mainstream 
media’s agenda aligns with a broader group of the public, partisan media may have a 
stronger two-way connection with certain groups of people - those who have higher 
partisan involvement and thus read news media to reinforce their existing opinions 
(Camaj, 2014; Stroud, 2011). Guess et al. (2021) also implied that the increased 
consumption of partisan media online will inform people about certain issues, yet erode 
trust in mainstream media, which could impair the latter's agenda-setting effect. As 
several competing mechanisms could be at work at the same time, I am interested in the 
final outcome: At an aggregate level, how will media with different political orientations 
present divergent patterns in their two-way agenda-setting effects? I present the following 
hypothesis: 
H6a-b. Media characteristics, including (a) media type (i.e., whether a media 
outlet is digital native) and (b) political orientation, will influence the direction and 
strength of the two-way agenda-setting effect. 
Lastly, due to technical constraints, a previously less studied group of factors are 
individual characteristics, which can be examined with connected survey and social 
media data in this study. Traditional agenda-setting studies focus on the need for 
orientation as the key individual level moderator, with other factors, such as education, 
also briefly mentioned (McCombs, 2014). If social media has extended the role of 
individuals to include both message receiver and sender, it is logical to explore the 
impact of personal influence.  




agenda-setting relationships with the media. First, Wanta (1997) examined the effects of 
five demographic variables (i.e., age, education, income, gender, and race) on salience 
transfer of issues covered by local newspapers and found that media have a stronger 
agenda-setting effect on people with higher education levels. It was argued that the well-
educated population pays more attention to news and are more sensitive to a diverse 
range of issues (Coombs & MacKuen, 1981). Additionally, people with higher household 
income were assumed to be less susceptible to media’s agenda-setting on certain issues, 
such as unemployment, since they have lower relevance and need for orientation (Zhu & 
Boroson, 1997). Nevertheless, studies in the 20th century found minimal evidence that 
these demographics have strong moderating effects on agenda-setting relationships. 
This minimal moderation conclusion, however, should be reexamined in the 
digital era. First, the existence of digital divides limits underprivileged social groups’ 
access to digital news channels that update almost instantly (van Dijk & Hacker, 2003). 
In addition to basic attitudes, access, and skills divide, usage divide has become the major 
type of divide that we are facing (van Deursen & van Dijk, 2014). Women, the elderly, 
and the lower income population were found to use the Internet less for news. Thus, at an 
aggregated level, we could expect lower correspondence between the public and media 
agenda among these social groups. Second, even given the same amount of actual digital 
news exposure, the agenda-setting effect may still differ by demographics individually. 
While the earlier literature claimed no significant difference between people of dissimilar 
demographic characteristics in terms of their vulnerability to the news agenda (e.g., the 




1979), this assumption is challenged by the demographically uneven exposure to 
misinformation, which was proved to be linked with lower trust in media (Ognyanova et 
al., 2020). Third, the reverse agenda-setting effect may also be stronger between new 
media and the public agenda of those from the privileged social groups. Zhang et al. 
(2021) revealed that the younger and more educated population used social media more 
frequently for active political opinion sharing. Recent studies also connected 
demographic factors to the likelihood of one gaining influence on SNSs. For instance, 
Hong et al. (2017) showed that female and older Facebook users are more likely to 
receive “likes” than their counterparts. Therefore, we can expect that the agenda-setting 
effects are moderated by demographics.  
Two other factors, opinion leadership and social capital, may also impact the 
likelihood of someone’s opinion being picked up by journalists. As mentioned above, 
Brosius and Weimann (1996) proposed that the “early-recognizers,” those who score high 
in the opinion leadership scale (i.e., the SP scale), should be differentiated from the other 
members of the public, as they have a stronger ability to identify emerging issues and 
diffuse them to news media. This gap between actors with high and low opinion 
leadership could be more salient over time as the capability of getting news media’s 
attention features a “rich-get-richer” pattern (Seguin, 2016). Dubois et al. (2020) also 
suggested that influencing and getting interaction from journalists were important 
motivations for opinion leaders to post opinions on SNSs. Similarly, people with higher 
social capital - the resources gained from direct relationships with others or membership 




al. (2012) also presented a positive relationship between one’s social capital and online 
network size. A larger friend network online, theoretically, will increase the likelihood of 
one’s posts being shared and exposed to journalists. A large network increases the 
possibility of social endorsement (e.g., likes), which makes posts look more credible to 
audiences, including journalists (Messing & Westwood, 2014). Thus, the reverse 
direction of agenda-setting can be assumed to be stronger than the traditional one among 
SNS users with higher opinion leadership and/or social capital. The following hypothesis 
is proposed accordingly:  
H7a–c. Individual characteristics, including (a) demographic factors (i.e., gender, 
age, race, household income, and education level), (b) opinion leadership, and (c) 
social capital, will influence the direction and strength of the two-way agenda-
setting effect. 
To illustrate visually, the comprehensive two-way agenda-setting framework 
proposed in this study is as below: 
 
 




CHAPTER 3 Data and Methods 
To reiterate, the goals of this research are to examine (1) differences between the 
two versions of public agenda (self-reported prioritized vs. social media issue agenda); 
(2) differences between the two versions of media agenda; and (3) factors influencing the 
direction of the agenda-setting effect. To empirically test the hypotheses and research 
questions regarding the three overarching questions, I take discussions around the 2020 
US presidential election as an example.  
The selection of this time period is derived from two reasons. First, election time 
is when the majority of classic agenda-setting studies were conducted, as it is arguably 
the time when both the public and the media pay the most attention to social issues 
(McCombs, 2014). As discussed previously, the intention of this research is to examine 
the competitive relationship between various public issues. Analysis results based on the 
election may better reflect the direction of policy agenda changes and inform future 
campaign strategies.  
Second, uniquely among presidential elections, the 2020 election happened during 
a global public health crisis — the COVID-19 pandemic, which may have further 
magnified the potential multi-version two-way agenda-setting effects. On the one hand, 
reports have shown that both traditional news consumption and social media usage have 
dramatically increased during the pandemic, especially on digital platforms. This increase 
may be attributed to people’s different levels of anxiety about health, economy, and 
political uncertainty, as well as the increased spare time under lockdown/quarantine. 




their time spent on digital news by 215% from 2019 to 202. In another survey conducted 
among North American SNS users, a majority of participants revealed that they increased 
their information consumption (72%) and posting (43%) behaviors on social media 
(Wold, 2020).  
On the other hand, the pandemic may have also widened the gap between 
different types of media and social groups among the public in terms of the distinct 
amount of attention paid to different issues (i.e., different agendas). For instance, news 
media with different political orientations were found to have distinctive agendas about 
the election and the COVID-19 pandemic (Jurkowitz & Mitchell, 2020; Mitchell et al., 
2021). Research has also shown that conservatives and liberals showed divergent health 
risk perception and perceived media accuracy (Rothgerber et al., 2020), as well as 
different levels of susceptibility to media’s agenda-setting effect (Calvillo et al., 2020). 
Thus, it is of greater importance to examine how the individual-, media-, and issue-level 
contingent factors affect the two-way agenda-setting relationship around this period of 
time. Nevertheless, the generalizability of this study might also be compromised due to 
the distinctiveness of this year. My goal here is not to find universal patterns, but to list 
all potential confounding situations so as to try to identify the true effects of the focal 
variables.  
3.1. Data Collection 
The data used in this dissertation consist of four parts — two of the public agenda 
and two of the media agenda. The two versions of the public agenda were measured by 




expression frequency on each issue. The two versions of the news agenda are 
operationalized as the relative amount of news coverage on the websites and the 
organizational Twitter accounts of 27 US major news media.  
This study focuses on organizational and individual use of Twitter, as opposed to 
other SNS, for multiple reasons. Twitter is one of the most popular SNS in the US. By the 
end of 2020, Twitter reached 192 million average daily active users (@TwitterIR, 2021). 
23% of US adults are Twitter users in 2021 (Auxier & Andersen, 2021). Although not as 
widely used as the more strong-tie-based SNSs such as Facebook and Instagram, Twitter 
is arguably the most open platform for news dissemination and public opinion 
observation. The high anonymity and asymmetrical relationships on Twitter make it an 
effective information-sharing platform (Halpern et al., 2017). In a 2010 study, scholars 
found that 85% of topics in tweets are news in nature, either breaking news or news that 
last longer (Kwak et al., 2010).  
This number should be attributed to the active engagement of both the public and 
news media. On the one hand, 17% of US adults use Twitter for news (Newman et al., 
2020). Besides news consumption, 54% of Twitter users also tweeted about the news, 
among which 33% are from news media accounts, according to a Pew report (Barthel & 
Shearer, 2015). On the other hand, Twitter is also the most news-friendly for newsrooms. 
It is more effective in terms of reaching wider audiences compared to Facebook (Ju et al., 
2014). Journalists also heavily rely on their own Twitter feeds and the alert from 
analytical tools, which often feature Twitter as the most important data source, to inform 




national survey that journalists value Twitter more than Facebook. Thus, even though 
criticisms exist toward recent public opinion analyses for their overreliance on Twitter 
data, it is indeed the most visible representation of online public opinion for journalists. 
In this study, I have no intention to be involved in the debate on whether the journalists 
should diversify their social media sources for public opinion normatively, but rather to 
focus on the outcomes of the current situation.   
3.1.1. Public Agenda 
As mentioned above, this study matches a national representative survey and the 
respondents’ Twitter data using their Twitter handles to compare the two versions of the 
public agenda.  
3.1.1.1. Survey 
The survey data collection was conducted from October 28, 2020, to December 
21, 2020, around the time of the 2020 US presidential election when social issues were 
discussed most heatedly. A questionnaire was distributed online to Twitter users and 
administered by Qualtrics, a US-based survey company that manages multiple online 
panels. To achieve representativeness, the gender and age distributions of the collected 
sample match with those of Twitter users (Kemp, 2019; Pew Research Center, 2019), as 
this study focuses on people who have a Twitter handle and will express themselves on 
Twitter. In the survey, respondents were asked to provide a valid Twitter handle that (a) 
belongs to themselves, (b) had been used in the past week before the survey date, and (c) 




Application Program Interface (API). Respondents who did not meet all three conditions 
were excluded from the final sample. A data validation process was conducted each day 
during the data collection with the R package “rtweet” to check if the provided handles 
met the three conditions. Among the final 854 valid samples, 52.29% of participants are 
males, 46.42% are females, and 1.29% were self-identified as “other gender.” This 
sample has slightly more females than the general Twitter population. The median age is 
35 years old (SD = 16.08), which roughly matches the general Twitter population (Pew 






Gender Male 527 52.29% 56.2% 
 Female 440 46.42% 43.8% 
 Other 11 1.29% - 
 Missing 1 .12% - 
     
Income Less than $25,000 183 19.79% - 
 $25,000 to $34,999 136 14.52% - 
 $35,000 to $49,999 130 13.93% - 
 $50,000 to $74,999 179 17.21% - 
 $75,000 to $99,999 141 14.05% - 
 $100,000 to $149,999 121 11.83% - 
 $150,000 to $199,999 52 5.27% - 
 $200,000 or more 37 3.40% - 
     
Race Black/African American 134 13.35% - 
 White/Caucasian 698 72.01% - 
 Hispanic/Latino 83 8.08% - 
 Asian 37 3.98% - 
 Native American 9 .82% - 
 Pacific Islander 2 .23% - 




     
Education 
level 
Less than high school 
degree 
19 2.11% - 
 
High school graduate 
(high school diploma or 
equivalent including 
GED) 
173 18.50% - 
 
Some college but no 
degree 
234 24.00% - 
 
Associate degree in 
college (2-year) 
119 11.71% - 
 
Bachelor's degree in 
college (4-year) 
258 26.23% - 
 Master's degree 137 13.70% - 
 Doctoral degree 17 1.76% - 
 
Professional degree (JD, 
MD) 
22 1.99%  
     
Age 18-29 385 40.05% 42% 
 30-49 305 27.40% 27% 
 50-64 210 22.48% 18% 
 65+ 79 7.73% 7% 
 Missing 23 2.34% 6% 
Table 3.1. Demographic traits of the surveyed participants (N = 854). 
 
3.1.1.2. Twitter Data 
After identifying the valid handles, all tweets posted in the three months before 
the survey date, were collected using “rtweet.” A cleaning process was also conducted to 
exclude automatically generated content by third-party platforms1 and non-English 
content (only kept English and undefined tweets). Additionally, only tweets posted within 
 
1 Here, I excluded sources that use Twitter API to auto-generate and auto-post content such as ads and 
sweepstakes (i.e., content that was not posted by the users themselves), but kept tweets from 
publishing tools, as the posted content is still created by the users. The final list of sources includes 
Buffer, IFTTT, Mobile Web (M2), Salsa Social Publishing, Streamlabs Twitter, Tweet Suite, 
TweetCaster for Android, TweetDeck, Twittascope, Twitter for Android, Twitter for iPad, Twitter for 




three months (92 days) before each participant’s unique survey response date was 
included, which means that each participant has their unique date range for three months. 
As these personal tweets include original, commented, and retweeted posts, the 
corresponding commented/retweeted content was combined with the user’s own 
comments to inform the issue discussed. The final sample includes 378,594 tweets, 
ranging from July 29, 2020 to the end of December 21, 202. 
3.1.2. Media Agenda 
3.1.2.1. News headlines 
To explore the two versions of media agenda, I first collected the headlines of all 
news items (including news articles and news videos) and news tweets posted by the 
organizational Twitter accounts from the official websites of 27 US major news outlets 
(see Table 3.2) from July 29, 2020, three months before the first survey response date, to 
December 21, 2020, the date when the last survey response was finished. The news 
headlines were collected from Media Cloud, an open-source platform that archives 
millions of online news stories nearly real-time. As One America News Network 
(OANN) was not in the database of Media Cloud, the OANN news headlines were 
downloaded through Brandwatch, a US-based third-party data provider. After collecting 
all items from news websites, only headlines of news articles were used to (1) match with 
the length of news tweets and (2) keep it consistent across news articles and news videos. 
Previous studies have shown that analyzing news headlines is adequate for first- and 




number of 393,289 news headlines were analyzed. 
3.1.2.2. News tweets 
Similarly, the news tweets were collected using Brandwatch by searching the 
usernames of the 27 news outlets. One thing to note about tweets is that some news 
media have multiple Twitter accounts, such as some regional or sectional ones (e.g., New 
York Times has @nytimes, @nytimesarts, @nytimesworld, @nytimesbooks, 
@nytimestravel, @nytimesopinion, and @nytimesmusic, etc.). To keep all media 
comparable, only the main accounts were included in the analysis (i.e., @nytimes). The 









Media name Website Twitter account Twitter followers Digital-native? 
Mainstream 
media 
ABC News abcnews.go.com @ABC 15,989,529 No 
 CBS News cbsnews.com  @CBSNews 7,780,502 No 
 Chicago Tribune chicagotribune.com  @chicagotribune 1,124,985 No 
 CNN cnn.com @CNN 50,157,383 No 
 Los Angeles Times latimes.com  @latimes 3,699,460 No 
 NBC News nbcnews.com  @NBCNews 7,851,266 No 
 New York Times nytimes.com  @nytimes 47,645,254 No 
 Newsweek newsweek.com @Newsweek 3,452,772 No 
 NPR npr.org @NPR 8,420,716 No 
 PBS pbs.org  @PBS 2,279,129 No 
 The Hill thehill.com @thehill 3,974,875 No 
 USA Today usatoday.com @USATODAY 4,162,018 No 
 Wall Street Journal wsj.com @WSJ 16,472,445 No 
 Washington Post washingtonpost.com @washingtonpost 18,149,113 No 
  Yahoo news news.yahoo.com @YahooNews 1,108,764 Yes 
Conservative 
media 
Fox News foxnews.com  @FoxNews 19,860,390 No 
 POLITICO politico.com  @politico 4,313,419 Yes 
 Breitbart breitbart.com  @BreitbartNews 1,536,540 Yes 
 Newsmax newsmax.com @Newsmax 384,372 No 
 One America News oann.com @OANN 1,169,142 No 
  The Daily Caller dailycaller.com @DailyCaller 769,862 No 
Liberal media Daily Kos  dailykos.com @dailykos 291,620 No 







 Mother Jones motherjones.com @MotherJones 848,695 No 
 MSNBC msnbc.com @MSNBC 3,668,136 No 
 Slate slate.com @slate 1,807,982 Yes 
  The Blaze theblaze.com @theblaze 754,967 Yes 




3.2. Data Processing 
3.2.1. Survey Measurements 
The survey probed the public agenda using a series of the Most Important 
Problem (MIP) questions. It also contains measurements of other individual 
characteristics that cannot be intuited by online tracking data (i.e., Twitter data). These 
include people’s news consumption, willingness to self-censor (WTSC), opinion 
leadership, social capital, and demographic variables. The detailed measurements are as 
follows. 
3.2.1.1. The MIP questions  
In the survey, I first measured individuals’ perceived issue salience by asking the 
participants “in your opinion, how important are the following issues to this country 
TODAY?” on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Not important at all, 7 = Extremely important). 
The surveyed 19 issues were adapted from the top issues of the longitudinal Most 
Important Problem poll results from Gallup Polls (Gallup Inc, 2021), including Economy 
in general, Unemployment/jobs, Taxes, Foreign trade and foreign policy, Healthcare, 
Education, Environment, Race relations/racism, Immigration, Politics/Government, 
Terrorism, Guns/gun control, Drugs, Religion/morality, Media/Internet, Crime, Gender 
equality and abortion, Military, and LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) rights. 
Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 summarize the basic descriptives and correlations between the 19 





 N Mean SD 
Issue 1 (General economy) 854 6.06 1.07 
Issue 2 (Unemployment/jobs) 854 6.08 1.03 
Issue 3 (Taxes) 854 5.50 1.24 
Issue 4 (Foreign trade/policy) 854 5.17 1.20 
Issue 5 (Healthcare) 854 6.27 1.06 
Issue 6 (Education) 853 5.96 1.12 
Issue 7 Environment) 854 5.89 1.42 
Issue 8 (Race relations/racism) 853 5.88 1.47 
Issue 9 (Immigration) 853 5.41 1.44 
Issue 10 (Politics/Government) 854 5.74 1.25 
Issue 11 (Terrorism) 854 5.27 1.53 
Issue 12 (Guns/gun control) 853 5.51 1.57 
Issue 13 (Drugs) 854 5.08 1.49 
Issue 14 (Religion/morality) 854 4.28 1.90 
Issue 15 (Media/Internet) 854 4.95 1.50 
Issue 16 (Crime) 854 5.54 1.30 
Issue 17 (Gender equality/abortion) 854 5.33 1.33 
Issue 18 (Military) 854 4.95 1.58 
Issue 19 (LGBT rights) 854 4.99 1.86 








 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Issue 1 1                  
Issue 2 .440** 1                 
Issue 3 .364** .284** 1                
Issue 4 .370** .284** .359** 1               
Issue 5 .232** .372** .199** .199** 1              
Issue 6 .225** .328** .149** .253** .368** 1             
Issue 7 .138** .306** .093** .184** .485** .382** 1            
Issue 8 .020 .215** .000 .050 .359** .336** .428** 1           
Issue 9 .241** .192** .187** .439** .140** .135** .060 .153** 1          
Issue 10 .265** .195** .214** .370** .223** .262** .201** .308** .272** 1         
Issue 11 .266** .234** .285** .420** .131** .173** .085* .074* .343** .195** 1        
Issue 12 .115** .229** .149** .202** .316** .227** .290** .386** .227** .322** .287** 1       
Issue 13 .245** .261** .361** .355** .256** .168** .155** .174** .276** .204** .420** .337** 1      
Issue 14 .121** .086* .254** .261** .020 .079* -.102** .040 .214** .160** .322** .140** .359** 1     
Issue 15 .219** .174** .259** .360** .225** .259** .172** .167** .240** .250** .188** .204** .283** .276** 1    
Issue 16 .292** .300** .351** .314** .163** .218** .020 .040 .261** .225** .555** .336** .448** .316** .217** 1   
Issue 17 .050 .226** .121** .158** .387** .340** .427** .587** .283** .316** .171** .431** .253** .152** .258** .127** 1  
Issue 18 .308** .169** .295** .469** .000 .116** -.050 -.112** .242** .209** .457** .107** .360** .397** .247** .405** .000 1 
Issue 19 -.060 .148** -.005 .040 .296** .249** .429** .561** .154** .195** .010 .316** .060 -.050 .149** -.010 .633** -.149** 
Table 3.4. Correlation matrix of the 19 MIP variables. 




3.2.1.2. Willingness to self-censor  
As the study hypothesizes that self-censorship intervenes in the relationship 
between the two public agendas — the one represented by self-reported survey and the 
one on social media — the study included WTSC as a moderating variable. WTSC was 
measured based on a 6-item 5-point Likert scale adapted from Hayes et al. (2005). The 
items were adjusted to focus on political expression on social media. Examples include 
"It is difficult for me to express my political opinions on social media if I think others 
won't agree with what I say" and "There have been many times when I thought that the 
content others posted on social media was wrong, but I didn't let them know" (1 = 
Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree; M = 2.72, SD = .84, Cronbach’s α = .77).  
3.2.1.3. Media consumption 
This study also measured the participants’ traditional and online news media 
consumption frequencies as control variables when exploring the reasons behind the 
discrepancies between the two versions of the public agenda. For traditional media 
consumption, the participants were asked how often they get news from traditional media 
sources, including printed newspaper, printed news magazine, television news (cable or 
local network news), and radio (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree; M = 2.72, SD 
= .92, Cronbach’s α = .77). Similarly, online news consumption was measured by self-
reported frequency of getting news from a list of sources, which consisted of online news 
websites, citizen journalism sites (non-professional journalism, e.g., blogs), Facebook, 
Twitter, Reddit, YouTube, Snapchat, Instagram, and News app (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 




3.2.1.4. Opinion leadership 
Opinion leadership was hypothesized as one of the factors influencing the 
direction and strength of the two-way agenda-setting effects. Based on the previous 
literature (Valente & Pumpuang, 2007), there are 10 types of methods to measure opinion 
leadership, such as celebrities, positional approach, and sociometric. I adopted two 
methods to identify individuals who have higher and lower opinion leadership. The first 
method is using the Personality Strength (PS) scale created by Noelle-Neumann (1985). 
Weimann (1991) proved that the PS scale can effectively identify opinion leaders that 
match with their demographic, socioeconomic status, network position, and 
communicative activity activation frequency. A 10-item 5-point Likert scale was used to 
measure one’s PS (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree; M = 3.36, SD = .75, 
Cronbach’s α = .85). The participants were asked to what extent they, for instance, count 
on being successful in everything they do or a step ahead of others.  
As my survey samples are all Twitter users, the second method was used in 
particular to capture opinion leadership on Twitter. I adopted a commonly used method 
by counting the number of followers of each user (e.g., Arora et al., 2019; Yun et al., 
2016). Since the number of followers might have changed in the time span of the 
personal tweets collection process (i.e., each collected tweet has a corresponding number 
of followers of the author at the time when the tweet was collected), I took the average of 
all of the follower numbers for each user. The 854 users were divided into the higher- and 




3.2.1.5. Social capital  
People’s social capital measures were included as another set of factors 
influencing the strength and direction of the agenda-setting effects. In the survey, I 
measured offline social capital using a 6-items 5-point Likert scale adapted from Gil de 
Zúñiga et al. (2012) (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree; M = 3.69, SD = .83, 
Cronbach’s α = .79). Example items include “I have strong personal relationships with 
my family members” and “I like to keep a large network of acquaintances.” Participants 
who have higher than the average social capital score were assigned to the higher social 
capital group, with the rest in the lower social capital group. 
3.2.1.6. Demographic variables 
Besides the above focal variables, this study also included demographic variables, 
including age, gender, race, education, and income as potential factors impacting the 
nature of the agenda-setting effects. Again, Table 3.1 displays all descriptive statistics of 
these variables. For the sake of analytical parsimony, participants were all divided into 
binary or trinary groups based on the demographic factors. That is to say, this study 
compares the agenda-setting effects between people who are older and younger, who are 
males, females, and other genders, who are white and non-white, who possess higher and 
lower education levels, and who have higher and lower household income.  
3.2.2. Content Analysis 
Three datasets — personal tweets from the surveyed participants, news headlines 




assisted content analysis method with variations of BERT (Bidirectional Encoder 
Representations from Transformers), a state-of-the-art machine learning technique for 
natural language processing introduced by Google in 2018 (Devlin et al., 2019). The 
BERT model uses word embeddings, a way of presenting words in a vector space (words 
with similar meanings will be closer to each other). As a deep learning method, BERT is 
superior to traditional linear supervised machine learning models, such as support vector 
machine (SVM), because (1) it uses a bidirectional presentation, which takes both left 
and right context of a word into consideration and (2) it is based on the model pre-trained 
using digital texts. Thus, for specific tasks like the one in this dissertation, only a small 
training dataset is needed (Devlin et al., 2019). The introduction of BERT has 
dramatically improved prediction accuracy in different natural language processing 
(NLP) tasks. 
In particular, two sets of machine learning models were trained, one for personal 
tweets and one for news items. As one text can mention multiple issues, each set of the 
models contains 19 binary models to predict whether the text mentioned any of the 19 
issues. I used one model for both news headlines and news tweets as they tend to have 
similar vocabulary and styles.  
To create the human annotations for training, three student coders manually coded 
around 1% samples of the three datasets (personal tweets: N = 3,880; news headlines: N = 
3,958; news tweets N = 1,986). Each of the texts was allowed to have up to three topics. 
The coders were asked to code at most the three most predominant issues addressed in 




100 of the samples and compared their coding results with the version coded by the 
researcher. After discussing the discrepancies with the researcher, they coded another 
sample of 100 items. The final intercoder reliability indices are all higher than .800 
(News headlines: Krippendorff’s alpha = .877; News tweets: Krippendorff’s alpha = 
.854; Personal tweets: Krippendorff’s alpha = .816). Coded news headlines and news 
tweets were combined to train the news models, while the coded personal tweets were 
used to train separate sets of machine learning models. The final coding results were 
transferred to and entered the model training process as binary codes (1 = present; 0 = 
absent). 
As for training the models for personal tweets, I adopted BERTweet, a model 
specifically pre-trained using English tweets. This model was proved to perform better on 
tweet classification tasks than the previous state-of-the-art models (Nguyen et al., 2020). 
As the tokenizer of BERTweet can automatically normalize tweets (i.e., replace user 
mentions and Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) with special tokens “@USER” and 
“HTTPURL” and translate emotion icons into text strings), no cleaning process was 
conducted before the training steps. The accuracy of each model was measured by three 
indices: recall (i.e., the extent to which a model can identify all relevant cases), precision 
(i.e., the extent to which the identified cases are correctly categorized), and F1-score (i.e., 
the harmonic average of precision and recall). The formula of F1-score is as below: 
 
F1-score = 2 × ((precision × recall) / (precision + recall)) 
 




distribution across the target classes in the training dataset. In this study, as the initial 
round of training accuracy scores was not satisfactory due to the inadequate amount of 
positive training items, one way to solve this problem is to implement data augmentation 
by adding more positive samples - here, positive means samples coded as 1 (present). 
Since most models trained in the first round have high enough recall but low precision, 
the models should be able to identify most positive cases yet could make some mistakes 
for items with lower predicted probability of the positive category (i.e., “logit” in 
machine learning’s vocabulary). Thus, I applied the first round of models to predict all 
items and ranked the predicted results by the positive logits in descending order. I then 
reviewed the tweets from the highest logits until the classification does not make sense. 
These items were added back to the training set of each issue to enhance the training 
dataset, so that the positive/negative ratio is more balanced. The final macro average 
validation accuracy scores (F1-scores) of personal tweets models range from .89 to .99. 
Table 3.5 details the sample size of the training data and the accuracy scores and for each 
issue.  
Similarly, the two types of media agenda were computed using supervised 
machine learning with DistillBERT, a lighter variation of the original BERT model (Sanh 
et al., 2020). This model can achieve 95% of BERT’s performance with only around half 
the number of parameters of the BERT base model, which makes it especially useful in 
small text classification tasks like the current one (Sanh, 2020). A standard cleaning 
process was conducted by removing URLs, RTs, mentioned usernames, and special 




hashtag mark (#) was removed so that the hashtag content can be treated as the other 
words. The same two-step training strategy was used to improve the accuracy. The final 
macro average validation accuracy scores (F1-scores) of news tweets models range from 
.87 to .99 (see Table 3.6 for more detailed accuracy information).  
As the accuracy scores of issue 11 (terrorism) and issue 12 (gun/gun control) were 
not as desired, I used the lexicon method to identify news headlines and news tweets 
mentioning these two issues. The lexicon method, or dictionary-based method, is widely 
used in computer content analysis. A dictionary is built by assigning a list of relevant and 
defining keywords into predetermined categories. Computers then automatically detect if 
one of the keywords occurs in the text to determine whether the text belongs to a category 
(Riffe et al., 2014). This approach is sometimes criticized since the construction of the 
dictionary could introduce subjectivity and that word meanings could be ambiguous in 
different contexts. Nevertheless, it was shown to have high reliability because less human 
bias is involved when the computers categorize only based on the dictionary (Riffe et al., 
2014). Specific to these two issues, terrorism and gun, they have very clear and unique 
keywords that can be used to identify the occurrence of the issues. Thus, the lexicon 
method is particularly useful here.   
For issue 11, the keywords used to search were (terror* OR "ISIS") AND 
(America OR Biden OR Trump OR U.S.) NOT terrorize. Similarly, these Boolean logic 
search terms were used to detect issue 12: gun* OR second amendment OR 2nd 
amendment OR shot* OR shooting* OR AK-47 OR AK47 OR rifle OR NRA OR firearm 




accuracy, a random sample of 100 tweets each issue (50 positive samples and 50 negative 
samples) was coded manually by a student coder to compare with the computer-detected 

















Precision Recall F1-score Precision Recall F1-score 
Economy in general (1)  .177 150 .987 .960 .973 .662 .863 .749 .954 
Unemployment/jobs (2)  .104 150 .988 .984 .986 .932 .950 .941 .978 
Taxes (3)  .078 150 .997 .980 .988 .892 .984 .936 .981 
Foreign trade/policy (4)  .072 150 .996 .985 .990 .844 .948 .893 .983 
Healthcare (5)  .164 150 .985 .963 .974 .872 .947 .908 .960 
Education (6)  .047 150 .990 .999 .994 .989 .881 .932 .989 
Environment (7)  .089 50 .993 .980 .986 .876 .953 .913 .977 
Race relations/racism (8)  .137 80 .985 .959 .972 .824 .928 .873 .955 
Immigration (9)  .254 150 .997 .918 .956 .433 .959 .597 .934 
Politics/Government (10)  .270 40 .888 .887 .888 .895 .896 .896 .892 
Terrorism (11)  .133 52 .995 .954 .974 .612 .932 .739 .957 
Guns/gun control (12)  .074 100 .996 .982 .989 .701 .921 .797 .981 
Drugs (13)  .103 100 .993 .989 .991 .793 .852 .821 .984 
Religion/morality (14)  .070 50 .995 .981 .988 .905 .971 .937 .980 
Media/Internet (15)  .137 100 .976 .981 .979 .903 .882 .892 .964 
Crime (16)  .097 100 .981 .987 .984 .840 .790 .814 .970 
Gender equality/abortion (17)  .080 70 .986 .986 .986 .873 .873 .873 .974 
Military (18)  .060 40 .993 .982 .987 .867 .945 .904 .978 
LGBT rights (19) .049 100 .996 .992 .994 .916 .961 .938 .990 
Table 3.5. Validation accuracy from machine learning of the personal tweets dataset. 












Negative Positive Weighted average F1-
score/Krippendorff’s α Precision Recall F1-score Precision Recall F1-score 
Economy in general (1)  .152 50 .984 .963 .974 .795 .899 .844 .956 
Unemployment/jobs (2)  .134 25 .983 .969 .976 .772 .864 .815 .958 
Taxes (3)  .068 100 .989 .989 .989 .852 .852 .852 .979 
Foreign trade/policy (4)  .123 30 .993 .965 .979 .765 .945 .846 .964 
Healthcare (5)  .175 25 .949 .966 .958 .907 .862 .884 .937 
Education (6)  .038 50 .993 .993 .993 .939 .939 .939 .988 
Environment (7)  .070 50 .992 .993 .993 .824 .800 .812 .986 
Race relations/racism (8)  .122 35 .981 .973 .977 .820 .865 .841 .960 
Immigration (9)  .094 100 .991 .976 .984 .758 .897 .822 .971 
Politics/Government (10)  .307 40 .807 .944 .870 .947 .817 .877 .874 
Terrorism (11)  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA .950 
Guns/gun control (12)  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA .900 
Drugs (13)  .089 100 .996 .984 .990 .776 .933 .847 .982 
Religion/morality (14)  .096 50 .988 .988 .988 .791 .791 .791 .978 
Media/Internet (15)  .114 40 .982 .987 .984 .880 .846 .863 .972 
Crime (16)  .165 40 .983 .968 .975 .759 .854 .804 .957 
Gender equality/abortion (17)  .082 50 .993 .992 .993 .781 .806 .794 .986 
Military (18)  .079 45 .989 .983 .986 .826 .884 .854 .974 
LGBT rights (19) .021 20 .999 .992 .984 .791 .981 .876 .972 
Table 3.6. Validation accuracy from machine learning of the news headlines/tweets dataset. 
Note. All learning rate = .0001. Batch size = 8. Test set = 30%. For issue 11 and 12, no training information is provided here as 
the categorization was conducted using the lexicon method. I used 100 stratified random samples (50 positive samples and 50 




3.2.3. Contingent factors  
3.2.3.1 Issue characteristic 
The obtrusiveness of each issue was decided based on the previous literature 
(McCombs, 2004; Winter et al., 1982) and the special situation addressed at the 
beginning of this chapter about this election period. During this election, the COVID-19 
pandemic and its economic impacts, the #Blacklivesmatter movement, as well as the riots 
related to the election, have made this election period special. The employment status, 
health, and personal safety of millions of people were affected. Thus, among the 19 
issues, issue 1 (General economy), issue 2 (Unemployment/jobs), issue 5 (Healthcare), 
issue 8 (Race relations/racism), issue 10 (Politics/Government), and issue 16 (Crime) 
were marked as of higher obtrusiveness, since they are issues that the general public will 
have direct and firsthand experience with. The rest of the issues, including issue 3 
(Taxes), issue 4 (Foreign trade/policy), issue 6 (Education), issue 7 (Environment), issue 
9 (Immigration), issue 11 (Terrorism), issue 12 (Guns/gun control), issue 13 (Drugs), 
issue 14 (Religion/morality), issue 15 (Media/Internet), issue 17 (Gender 
equality/abortion), issue 18 (Military), issue 19 (LGBT rights) are among the lower 
obtrusive issues. I then compared the numbers of issues that show significant agenda-
setting results between the higher and lower obtrusiveness groups.  
3.2.3.2 Media characteristics  
Based on a Pew report about digital-native news outlets (Barthel & Stocking, 




The political orientation of each studied news media was decided based on the Media 
Bias Ratings provided by AllSides, which is dynamically calculated based on a blind bias 
survey, media’s own disclosure, third-party research, independent reviews, and so on 
(How AllSides Rates Media Bias, 2016). The 27 outlets were categorized as mainstream, 
conservative, or liberal news media. 
3.2.3.3 Individual characteristics  
As mentioned in the survey data collection section, a series of personal 
characteristics, including opinion leadership, social capital, and demographic factors 
(age, gender, race, household income, and education level) were collected through the 
survey and the Twitter data scraping process. Again, all of the participants were divided 
into two groups based on each of the characteristics to compare the agenda-setting effects 
between them.  
3.3. Data Analysis 
As stated previously, the three main goals of this research are to compare the two 
versions of the public agenda, contrast the two versions of the media agenda, and explore 
the direction and strength of the potential two-way agenda-setting effects. To achieve the 
three goals, I utilized three statistical analysis methods: order-rank correlation, 
hierarchical linear regression, and Granger causality tests. 
First, to compare the aggregate-level of agendas (RQ1, RQ2, and H3a-b), order-
rank correlation (i.e., Spearman’s correlation) indices were calculated between the four 
types of agendas. When aggregating the personal tweets and the two news datasets, I 




published by an individual or a media outlet and took the average for each issue. In this 
way, I can take the individual and cross-media difference on overall publishing frequency 
into account so as to focus on the relative issue salience. Significant and high correlation 
indicates that the two agendas show overall high overlap in terms of the relative issue 
salience. 
Second, to understand how self-censorship is related to the public agenda 
disparity (H1) and how the media characteristics influence the media agenda differences 
(H2) at an aggregate level, I divided the public and media agenda by the studied 
characteristics and calculated the order-rank correlation numbers between the broken-
down agendas.   
Third, I took a step further to look at individual-level differences between the two 
versions of public agenda — what people think and what people tweet (H1). Following 
the method of Shehata and Stromback (2013), 19 sets of hierarchical linear regressions 
were conducted to examine for each issue, (1) what the main effect of people’s perceived 
issue importance is on their relative Twitter expression frequency (i.e., the number of 
tweets about an issue/the total number of tweets within the three months) and (2) whether 
WTSC significantly moderates the relationship between people’s perceived issue 
importance and Twitter expression. Here, perceived issue importance was treated as a 
personal characteristic. Due to the cross-sectional nature of the datasets, the regression 
coefficients can only imply correlation without any direction, not causality. Reversing the 
IV and DV does not change the significance of the coefficients. 




reflected by datasets that have timestamps (personal tweets, news headlines, and news 
tweets), multivariate Granger causality tests were conducted among the three for each 
issue to examine the direction and strength of the effects (H4a-b, RQ3, and RQ4). 
Granger causality is a commonly used method to examine the temporal relationships 
between different agendas in agenda-setting studies (e.g., Guo & Vargo, 2017; Meraz, 
2011). The idea of the Granger causality test is to compare two models: One that only 
uses the past values to predict Y and one that uses both the previous values of X and Y to 
predict the future Y values. X is considered to “Granger-cause” Y if the latter model 
shows a better fit than the former based on the Wald test result (Granger, 1969). One 
thing to note is that Granger causality tests can only indicate temporal relationships 
between time series but do not guarantee any causality. According to the previous 
literature (Buhl et al., 2018; Harder et al., 2017), agenda-setting effects happen within 
hours on news websites and social media where news is updated almost instantly. Thus, 
the optimal lag was determined based on information criteria including AIC, HQIC, and 
SBIC, with a maximum value set as 6 hours following Buhl et al. (2018). The shortest 
time lag indicated by any of the three criteria was adopted. Here, to rule out the influence 
of the daily fluctuation of the number of items (personal tweets, news headlines, and 
news tweets) that was caused by exogenous factors (e.g., weekends, holidays, or special 
events), I used the sum of the daily percentages of each issue in the analyses. Therefore, 
the daily percentages of news items and personal tweets were aggregated by hour, which 
led to 3,505 time points (from 7/29/2020 0:00 to 12/22/2020 0:00). 19 Granger causality 




setting relationships among the social media public agenda and the two versions of media 
agenda. In addition, to answer RQ2 from a time-series perspective, similar Granger 
causality tests were conducted between the two versions of media agenda, with personal 
tweets controlled to eliminate the potential confounding effect (i.e., both versions of 
media agenda could be affected by personal tweets at the same time). A majority rule was 
used to determine the direction of agenda-setting effects following Guo and Zhang 
(2020). In other words, if one direction has 10 or more issues that show significant 
Granger causality results out of the 19 issues, this direction will be regarded as showing a 
strong enough agenda-setting effect. If both directions have no more than 10 significant 
issues, the direction with more significant issues will be regarded as relatively stronger. 
Lastly, more Granger causality tests were carried out to explore the differentiated 
agenda-setting relationships among various user groups and media with different 
characteristics. To examine whether the difference between the two versions of the media 
agenda is conditional on media type from a time-series perspective (H2), I conducted the 
same Granger causality tests on digital-native media and non-digital-native media and 
compared the number of significant issues. To test H5, I compared the average number of 
significant issues between the higher and lower obtrusive issue groups. As for H6a-b, the 
total number of significant issues was calculated and compared between the two media 
groups, which were categorized based on the two media characteristics (see section 
3.2.3.2). While the higher number of issues with significant Granger causality results 
implies a stronger agenda-setting effect, the majority rule was still adopted to identify 




agenda was broken down by individual characteristics (H7a-c; see 3.2.3.3). Each 
characteristic entered the Granger causality tests to examine the nuanced differences 
between the participants' groups. Finally, 12 (1 overall + 3 media characteristics + 8 





CHAPTER 4 Results 
Based on empirical datasets collected during the 2020 US presidential election, 
this study mainly examined three key questions: (1) whether and how two versions of 
public agenda are different from each other; (2) whether and how two versions of media 
agenda are different from each other; and (3) whether and how the two-way agenda-
setting effects exist between the public and the media agenda. 
Overall, the empirical results confirmed the existence of a multi-version, two-
way, yet imbalanced agenda-setting pattern. The two versions of the public agenda are 
fairly different, while the two versions of the media agenda largely resemble each other. 
A closer look shows that while self-censorship only marginally moderated the difference 
between the two versions of public agenda on several issues, media with various 
characteristics indeed had distinct patterns in terms of their headlines-tweets 
correspondence. The agenda-setting analyses verified the existence of a bi-directional 
relationship between the public agendas and media agendas, with the traditional direction 
still stronger than the reverse in general. The results also revealed differentiated agenda-
setting direction and strength among different social groups and different media outlets.  
4.1 Comparing Between the Two Versions of Public Agenda 
RQ 1 asks if the two versions of public agenda — the one represented by self-
reported perceived issue importance through a survey and the one represented in social 
media expression — are different from each other. Spearman’s correlation results show 
that the two versions of the public agenda from the same group of people did not 




Table 4.2 displays the salience rankings of the two versions of the public agenda. Issue 5 
(healthcare), issue 2 (unemployment/jobs), and issue 1 (general economy) are the top 
three most important issues reported by the participants, whereas the most discussed  
 




Survey 1    
Personal tweets .193 1   
News headlines .499* .470* 1  
News tweets .465* .465* .847*** 1 
Table 4.1. Spearman’s correlation results between the four types of agenda. 












Issue 1 (General economy) 6.06 3 .019 6 
Issue 2 (Unemployment/jobs)  6.08 2 .011 12 
Issue 3 (Taxes)  5.5 10 .009 18 
Issue 4 (Foreign trade/ policy)  5.17 14 .010 13 
Issue 5 (Healthcare) 6.27 1 .036 4 
Issue 6 (Education)  5.96 4 .010 16 
Issue 7 (Environment) 5.89 5 .014 11 
Issue 8 (Race relations/racism)  5.88 6 .041 2 
Issue 9 (Immigration) 5.41 11 .039 3 
Issue 10 (Politics/Government) 5.74 7 .111 1 
Issue 11 (Terrorism)  5.27 13 .017 8 
Issue 12 (Guns/gun control)  5.51 9 .009 19 
Issue 13 (Drugs) 5.08 15 .010 15 
Issue 14 (Religion/morality) 4.28 19 .023 5 
Issue 15 (Media/Internet)  4.95 17 .017 7 
Issue 16 (Crime)  5.54 8 .016 9 
Issue 17 (Gender equality/ abortion) 5.33 12 .015 10 
Issue 18 (Military)   4.95 18 .009 17 
Issue 19 (LGBT rights) 4.99 16 .010 14 
Table 4.2. Issue salience calculations and the corresponding ranking of the two versions of 




issues on Twitter among this sample are issue 10 (politics/government), issue 8 (race 
relations/racism), and issue 9 (immigration). The least important issues and the least 
posted issues are also distinctive: issue 14 (religion/morality), issue 18 (military), issue 
15 (media/Internet) were scored in the survey as relatively not as important to the society 
during this election, while issue 12 (guns/gun control), issue 3 (taxes), and issue 18 
(military) surprisingly gained the smallest number of tweets. 
 As mentioned in Chapter 3, regression analyses were also conducted to examine if 
the two versions of the public agenda align at an individual level. Block 4 in Table 4.3 
indicates the results. With the overall number of tweets, demographic variables, and news 
consumption variables controlled, only on issue 14 (religion/morality; β = .054, p < .05) 
and issue 19 (LGBT rights, β = .077, p < .05) that we can see a significant and positive 
relationship between perceived issue importance and Twitter expression frequency. In 
other words, people who believed that these two issues are more important to society 
today also talked relatively more about them on their Twitter accounts. Issue 1 (general 
economy; β = .042, p < .1), issue 5 (healthcare; β = .043, p < .1), issue 8 (race 
relations/racism; β = .044, p < .1) also show agenda correspondence at a .1 significance 






















Block 1: All tweets count       
  All tweets count (in three months) .701*** .627*** .552*** .560*** .694*** .554*** 
R2 .491*** .393*** .304*** .313*** .482*** .307*** 
Block 2: Demographics variables      
  Age .089*** .090** .124*** .107*** .113*** .014 
  Gender (compare to males)       
    Female -.063** -.010 -.042 -.071* -.024 .008 
    Other -.057* -.047† -.041 -.043 -.049† -.044 
  Race (compare to White/Caucasian)      
    Black/African American -.026 -.025 -.024 .026 -.021 .039 
    Hispanic/Latino -.055* -.051† -.050† -.029 -.024 -.007 
    Asian -.013 -.027 -.012 -.002 -.014 -.004 
    Native American -.006 -.009 -.003 -.002 -.006 .003 
    Pacific Islander .001 .013 .005 .006 .012 .016 
    Other .018 .043 .013 .005 .023 .029 
  Household income .011 .004 .013 .026 -.002 -.047 
  Education level .043 .032 -.017 .016 .048† .084* 
△R2 .026*** .021 .025** .023** .025*** .010 
Block 3: News consumption       
  Traditional news consumption -.056† -.041 -.004 -.045 -.023 -.022 
  Online news consumption .054† .035 .027 .010 .011 -.081* 
△R2 .002 .001 .001 .001 .000 .007* 
Block 4: Focal variables       
  Willingness to self-censor (WTSC) -.068** -.075** -.065* -.065* -.049* .000 
  MIP .042† .024 .026 .023 .043† .003 





Block 5: Interaction term       
  WTSC × MIP -.191 -.153 -.011 -.227† -.174 -.207 
△R2 .001 .000 .000 .002† .001 .001 
Total R2 .526*** .422*** .334*** .344*** .512*** .326*** 
Table 4.3. Hierarchical linear regressions on personal tweets count about the 19 issues (issue 1-6). 
Note. Entries are final-entry ordinary least squares (OLS) standardized coefficients (β). p-values are two-tailed. †p <.10, *p 





















Block 1: All tweets count       
  All tweets count (in three months) .285*** .737*** .775*** .678*** .673*** .723*** 
R2 .081*** .543*** .601*** .459*** .453*** .522*** 
Block 2: Demographics variables      
  Age .059 -.015 .118*** .129*** .139*** .092*** 
  Gender (compare to males)       
    Female .028 .022 -.025 -.022 -.039 -.057* 
    Other .002 -.012 -.033 -.046 -.033 -.055* 
  Race (compare to White/Caucasian)      
    Black/African American -.021 .101*** -.015 -.034 .010 .000 
    Hispanic/Latino -.007 -.002 -.016 -.064 -.005 -.019 
    Asian -.009 -.001 -.021 -.024 -.014 .000 
    Native American -.002 -.001 .011 -.005 .025 -.003 
    Pacific Islander .001 .002 .008 .006 .007 .017 
    Other .004 .032 .022 .015 .015 .04 
  Household income -.044 .032 .017 .017 .023 .048† 
  Education level .043 -.038 .027 .000 .009 -.025 
△R2 .008 .014** .022*** .031*** .025*** .018*** 
Block 3: News consumption       
  Traditional news consumption -.011 -.037 -.063* -.016 -.062† -.057† 
  Online news consumption .020 .001 .035 .024 .063† .021 
△R2 .000 .001 .002† .000 .003† .002 
Block 4: Focal variables       
  Willingness to self-censor (WTSC) -.045 -.054* -.048* -.080** -.073* -.068* 
  MIP .039 .044† -.001 .029 .011 -.012 





Block 5: Interaction term       
  WTSC × MIP -.158 -.130 .024 -.234† .136 .069 
△R2 .001 .001 .000 .002† .001 .000 
Total R2 .094*** .564*** .628 .500*** .487*** .547*** 
Table 4.3 (cont.). Hierarchical linear regressions on personal tweets count about the 19 issues (issue 7-12). 

























Block 1: All tweets count        
  All tweets count (in three months) .713*** .708* .633*** .674*** .618*** .645*** .477*** 
R2 .508*** .502*** .401*** .454*** .381*** .417*** .227*** 
Block 2: Demographics variables       
  Age -.063* .104*** .113*** .129*** -.049† .123*** -.108*** 
  Gender (compare to males)        
    Female -.029 -.035 -.075** -.016 .011 -.041 -.010 
    Other -.009 -.036 -.046† -.037 -.016 -.043 .158*** 
  Race (compare to White/Caucasian)       
    Black/African American -.010 -.026 -.022 .018 .021 -.021 -.007 
    Hispanic/Latino .068** -.020 -.042 .006 -.013 -.015 -.002 
    Asian -.002 -.030 -.018 -.017 .001 -.028 -.008 
    Native American -.002 -.001 -.002 .002 -.008 .000 -.012 
    Pacific Islander -.009 .004 .004 .011 -.004 .008 -.009 
    Other .024 .011 .002 .031 .023 .010 .008 
  Household income -.017 -.015 .011 .040 -.005 .030 -.037 
  Education level -.030 .052† -.018 .001 .030 .037 .007 
△R2 .014* .022*** .025*** .022*** .004 .029*** .044*** 
Block 3: News consumption        
  Traditional news consumption -.058† .050† -.047 -.067* -.026 .006 -.062 
  Online news consumption .007 -.009 .027 .049 -.011 -.007 -.032 
△R2 .003 .000 .001 .003 .001 .000 .006* 
Block 4: Focal variables        
  Willingness to self-censor (WTSC) -.007 -.038 -.058* -.060* -.038 -.066* -.003 
  MIP .023 .054* .031 .036 .034 .015 .077* 





Block 5: Interaction term        
  WTSC × MIP .059 -.069 -.128 -.102 -.041 -.067 .019 
△R2 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Total R2 .525*** .528*** .432*** .484*** .389*** .450*** .283*** 
Table 4.3 (cont.). Hierarchical linear regressions on personal tweets counts about the 19 issues (issue 13-19). 




Hypothesis 1 further investigates if the discrepancies between the two forms of 
public agenda are conditional on individuals’ WTSC. The aggregated results (i.e., 
Spearman’s correlation) suggest that regardless of the level of WTSC, no significant 
order-rank correlation happens between the two versions of the public agenda (within the 
high WTSC group: rs(18) = .208, p = 393; within the lower WTSC group: rs(18) = .298, 
p = 215; z = .272, p = .393; see Table 4.4). The regression entries also demonstrate that 
WTSC only moderated issue 4 (foreign trade/policy) and issue 10 (politics/government) 
at the .1 level. The visualization in Figure 4.1 shows that for people who are low and 
medium in WTSC, the higher perceived importance of the two issues is indeed related to 
more expression about them on Twitter. Yet, for those who have a high willingness to 
self-censor, what they think is important might be tweeted even less. No significant 
interaction relationships were observed on other issues. Thus, H1 should be rejected. 
 
 














Survey (lower WTSC) 1    
Survey (higher WTSC)         .970*** 1   
Personal tweets (lower WTSC)     .298 .230 1  
Personal tweets (higher WTSC)         .251 .208 .905*** 1 
Table 4.4. Spearman’s correlation results between the two versions of public agenda by 
WTSC. 









Figure 4.1. The moderating effect of WTSC on the relationship between the perceived issue 
importance (MIP) and the number of tweets on issue 4 and issue 10. 
Note. This visualization uses the “pick-a-point” method, with low = M-1SD, mediuM = 




4.2 Comparing the Two Versions of Media Agenda 
After comparing the public agendas, RQ2 compares the two versions of the media 
agenda reflected by news headlines on media’s websites and by media’s social media 
posts. The results in Table 4.1 (p. 70) show high and significant order-rank correlation 
between them (rs(18) = .847, p < .001). The time-series analyses confirmed that the two 
versions of the agenda followed each other closely (see Table 4.6). New tweets Granger-
caused news headlines on 15 of the 19 issues, except for issues 9 (immigration), 11 
(terrorism), 13 (drugs), 19 (LGBT rights), even with the overtime changes of personal 
tweets controlled. News headlines followed news tweets on 18 out of the 19 issues 
(except for issue 9). The optimal lags range from 4 to 5 hours. In short, although on some 
issues the two versions of media agenda have distinctive salience, the two align with each 
other on most issues. Table 4.5 displays the issue rankings. 
H2 further scrutinizes whether the media type of the studied news media affects 
the headlines-tweets differences. The aggregated correlation results imply some 
variations across media with different characteristics (see Table 4.7). Between digital-
native and non-digital-native media, the latter had slightly higher correlation (rs(18) = 
.856, p < .001) compared to the former (rs(18) = .819, p < .001), meaning that non-
digital-native media publish slightly more similar agenda on their SNS accounts and their 
websites. However, a significance shows that these two correlation coefficients are not 
significantly different from each other (z = .352, p = .362). Thus. H2 was rejected at an 



















Issue 10 (Politics/Government) 87,352 1 .249 1 311,833 1 .403 1 
Issue 5 (Healthcare) 55,837 2 .144 2 54,285 2 .129 2 
Issue 16 (Crime)  37,626 4 .091 4 29,812 4 .084 3 
Issue 8 (Race relations/racism)  21,992 6 .060 6 30,129 3 .078 4 
Issue 4 (Foreign trade/policy)  36,017 5 .086 5 28,348 5 .069 5 
Issue 15 (Media/Internet)  21,346 7 .057 7 23,414 7 .064 6 
Issue 1 (General economy) 42,416 3 .093 3 26,460 6 .062 7 
Issue 7 (Environment) 18,520 9 .043 9 16,228 8 .039 8 
Issue 6 (Education)  9,885 14 .025 14 13,978 9 .035 9 
Issue 18 (Military)   11,403 11 .028 12 12,858 10 .033 10 
Issue 9 (Immigration) 10,650 12 .030 11 10,791 11 .027 11 
Issue 17 (Gender equality/ 
abortion) 
6,626 17 .018 17 10,450 12 .027 12 
Issue 2 (Unemployment/jobs)  19,229 8 .050 8 9,693 13 .024 13 
Issue 12 (Guns/gun control)  7,867 15 .019 15 7,297 15 .021 14 
Issue 19 (LGBT rights) 4,125 18 .011 18 8,058 14 .020 15 
Issue 3 (Taxes)  10,186 13 .027 13 6,925 16 .017 16 
Issue 13 (Drugs) 13,133 10 .031 10 5,857 17 .015 17 
Issue 14 (Religion/morality) 7,449 16 .019 16 5,252 18 .014 18 
Issue 11 (Terrorism)  871 19 .002 19 770 19 .002 19 






 Issue 1 Issue 2 Issue 3 Issue 4 Issue 5 Issue 6 Issue 7 Issue 8 Issue 9 Issue 10 Issue 11 
 Lag = 4 Lag = 5 Lag = 4 Lag = 5 Lag = 5 Lag = 4 Lag = 4 Lag = 4 Lag = 4 Lag = 4 Lag = 4 
NH→PT 15.19*** 18.62*** 73.23*** 7.66** 6.55** 6.87** 9.37** 28.64*** .41 21.50*** .04 
NT→PT .99 3.36† 12.58*** 6.51* 44.94*** 4.02* .45 49.45*** 2.71 .30 .36 
PT→NH 1.55 .07 36.03*** 3.65 13.90*** 8.65** .68 7.82** 5.76* 18.42*** .88 
NT→NH 9.41** 64.51*** 15.51*** 4.36* 25.44*** 9.45*** 28.73*** 93.67*** 1.32 276.50*** 2.96† 
PT→NT .12 .33 11.87*** .16 4.29* 3.37† 1.83 3.64*** 1.08 14.50*** 1.07 
NH→NT 103.22*** 284.88*** 73.11*** 173.16*** 408.32*** 147.83*** 61.81*** 92.62*** 1.22 26.13*** 9.47** 
Table 4.6. Granger causality Wald tests results on the overall agendas for the 19 issues (issue 1-11).  
Note. †p <.10, *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001. NH = News headlines; NT = News tweets; PT = Personal tweets. 
 
 Issue 12 Issue 13 Issue 14 Issue 15 Issue 16 Issue 17 Issue 18 Issue 19 
Count 
 Lag = 4 Lag = 4 Lag = 4 Lag = 4 Lag = 4 Lag = 4 Lag = 4 Lag = 4 
NH→PT 11.96*** .13 5.23* .06 .21 2.36 6.95** .96 12 
NT→PT 28.13*** .34 3.75† 1.15 32.10*** 1.32 42.71*** .00 8 
PT→NH 2.68 .50 .22 .55 4.17* .62 .99 .66 7 
NT→NH 111.93*** 1.34 4.02* 26.36*** 61.64*** 6.32* 37.18*** .37 15 
PT→NT 14.80*** .50 .45 .01 8.89** 4.83* 8.35** 2.60 7 
NH→NT 283.74*** 4.41* 27.31*** 52.19*** 72.64*** 87.70*** 76.15*** 4.08* 18 
Table 4.6 (cont.). Granger causality Wald tests results on the overall agendas for the 19 issues (issue 12-19). 





 NT (digital-native) NT (non-digital-native) NH (digital-native) 
NT (digital-native) 1   
NT (non-digital-native) .949*** 1  
NH (digital-native) .819*** .918*** 1 
NH (non-digital-native) .726*** .856*** .961*** 
 
Table 4.7. Spearman’s correlations between media that are digital-native and non-digital-native. 
Note. †p <.10, *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
 Issue 1 Issue 2 Issue 3 Issue 4 Issue 5 Issue 6 Issue 7 Issue 8 Issue 9 Issue 10 
 Lag = 2 Lag = 4 Lag = 3 Lag = 2 Lag = 4 Lag = 2 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 
NT (digital-native)→NH 
(digital-native) 
.99 5.61* .74 7.22* 2.32 1.99 34.99*** 1.67 .09 6.38* 
NT (non-digital-native)→
NH (non-digital-native) 
12.52*** 27.55*** 19.88*** 1.08 127.27*** 64.49*** 16.04*** 17.56*** .81 133.10*** 
NH (digital-native)→NT 
(digital-native) 
6.90** 14.78*** .15 .15 18.96*** 2.26 22.34*** 17.45*** .11 12.63*** 
NH (non-digital-native)→
NT (non-digital-native) 
32.37*** 215.62*** 58.01*** 66.23*** 264.53*** 7.07*** 23.89*** 21.64*** .02 115.02*** 
Table 4.8. Granger causality Wald test results between the two versions of media agenda by media with different media types 
(issue 1-10). 







 Issue 11 Issue 12 Issue 13 Issue 14 Issue 15 Issue 16 Issue 17 Issue 18 Issue 19 Count 
 Lag = 1 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 Lag = 1 Lag = 2 Lag = 4 Lag = 1 Lag = 3 Lag = 1  
NT (digital-native)→NH 
(digital-native) 
1.47 .87 .56 .13 .01 .03 1.64 .18 .04 4 
NT (non-digital-native) 
→NH (non-digital-native) 
.00 51.59*** .14 2.84† 5.74* 27.70*** 2.99† 34.94*** .15 12 
NH (digital-native)→NT 
(digital-native) 
.00 13.03*** .08 .95 3.11† 7.78*** .77 6.72** 4.39* 10 
NH (non-digital-native)→NT 
(non-digital-native) 
.59 52.64*** 13.57*** 8.19** 23.23*** 49.48*** 13.10*** 33.11*** .03 16 
Table 4.8 (cont.). Granger causality Wald test results between the two versions of media agenda by media with different media 
types (issue 11-19). 




If taking a closer look at the issue-level comparison between the two versions of 
the media agenda, the Granger causality results shown in Table 4.8 present a similar 
pattern with the correlation tests. According to the information summarized in the last 
column, news websites and Twitter accounts of non-digital-native media followed each 
other closely on most issues (NT → NH: 12/19 issues; NH → NT: 16/19 issues). Both 
directions meet the majority rule, which indicates a strong two-way influence. The same 
high alignment was not found for digital-native media (NT → NH: 4/19 issues; NH → 
NT: 10/19 issues). Only news tweets followed news headlines on a majority of issues, but 
not the reverse. Thus, the overall results indicate that although the aggregate correlations 
were not significantly different by media type, issue-level comparison indeed revealed 
distinctive patterns, with non-digital-native media having better correspondence. As the 
direction was the opposite of what was expected, H2 was also rejected at an issue level.  
4.3 The Two-way Agenda-setting effects      
The third sets of hypotheses and research questions explore the two-way agenda-
setting relationships. H3a–b tests if the traditional agenda-setting assumption still stands 
with this study. Table 4.1 shows significant and moderate correlations between the self-
reported issue importance and the two versions of media agenda (with news headlines: 
rs(18) = .499, p < .05; with news tweets: rs(18) = .465, p < .05). Both H3a and H3b are 
supported.  
H4a–b further looks at the two-way agenda-setting effects between the media 
agenda and the SNS public agenda. At the aggregate level, the SNS public agenda 




headlines: rs(18) = .470, p < .05; with news tweets: rs(18) = .465, p < .05), which 
supports H4a–b. The Granger causality results can be found in the last column of Table 
4.8. In general, we can indeed see a mutual influence: News headlines set the agenda for 
personal tweets on 12 out of the 19 issues, while the reverse happened on 7 of the 19 
issues. Similarly, news tweets Granger caused personal tweets on 8 issues, which is one 
issue more than the reverse (7 issues). If using the majority rule, only the route from news 
headlines to news tweets (i.e, the traditional direction) showed a strong agenda-setting 
effect. Thus, we can only conditionally accept H4a–b.  
One thing to note here is that although both versions of public agenda were 
moderately and significantly correlated with the media agendas, they did not match with 
each other. This situation happens when different parts in the issue order ranks of survey 
version and personal tweets version of public agenda show relatively stronger monotonic 
relationship with the media agenda (i.e., the issue ranking of the two media agendas). 
Table 4.9 shows a comparison of the issue ranking across the four agendas. For instance, 
while the ranking of personal tweets resembles the one of news tweets on the top of the 

















Issue 10 (Politics/Government) 1 1 7 1 
Issue 5 (Healthcare) 2 2 1 4 
Issue 16 (Crime) 3 4 8 9 
Issue 8 (Race relations/racism) 4 6 6 2 
Issue 4 (Foreign trade/ policy) 5 5 14 13 
Issue 15 (Media/Internet) 6 7 17 7 
Issue 1 (General economy) 7 3 3 6 
Issue 7 (Environment) 8 9 5 11 
Issue 6 (Education) 9 14 4 16 
Issue 18 (Military) 10 12 18 17 
Issue 9 (Immigration) 11 11 11 3 
Issue 17 (Gender equality/ abortion) 12 17 12 10 
Issue 2 (Unemployment/jobs) 13 8 2 12 
Issue 12 (Guns/gun control) 14 15 9 19 
Issue 19 (LGBT rights) 15 18 16 14 
Issue 3 (Taxes) 16 13 10 18 
Issue 13 (Drugs) 17 10 15 15 
Issue 14 (Religion/morality) 18 16 19 5 
Issue 11 (Terrorism) 19 19 13 8 
Table 4.9. Issue ranking comparison across the two versions of public agenda and two 
versions of media agenda 
As for RQ3, the above outcomes already demonstrated that in general, the 
traditional direction was slightly stronger. More specifically, the two directions were not 
disparate much on Twitter: New tweets set the agenda for personal tweets on 8 of 19 
issues, whereas the reverse effect was found significant on 7 out of the 19 issues. 
However, neither exceeded the majority number of issues. When it comes to news 
headlines, the traditional direction (12/19 issues) is much stronger than the reverse 
agenda-setting effect (7/19 issues). 
Table 4.8 also informs RQ4, which compares the agenda-setting strength between 




agenda-setting direction was found significant on 7 issues for both media agendas, no 
clear different can be detected in this direction. As for the traditional agenda-setting 
direction, the news website version of media agenda had significant agenda-setting 
effects on 12 issues, which overweighed the news tweets version (8 issues). In other 
words, personal tweets followed news websites’ agenda more closely than following 
news tweets. Nevertheless, the mutual agenda-setting effects (i.e., the media and the 
public set each other’s agenda) happened on 6 issues for news tweets, but only on 4 
issues for news headlines. In summary, while news websites had a stronger traditional 
agenda-setting power, news tweets presented a greater mutual influence with the public 
agenda (i.e., personal tweets here).  
4.4 Contingent Factors on the Agenda-setting Relationships 
The final group of hypotheses examines the issue-, media-, and individual-level of 
contingent factors and their impact on the two-way agenda-setting effects. First, H5 
hypothesized different agenda-setting patterns between obtrusive and unobtrusive issues. 
Table 4.10 displays the comparison of the numbers of issues that have significant agenda-
setting effects in all directions. In general, we can observe a stronger two-way agenda-
setting relationship among obtrusive issues compared to non-obtrusive issues: For all four 
directions, more than half of the obtrusive issues showed significant Granger causality 
results, whereas non-obtrusive issues only met the majority rule on one direction - news 
headlines to personal tweets. The percentages of significant Granger causality issues in 
each type are higher on obtrusive issues than the non-obtrusive ones, regardless of the 




section 2.4.3). H5 was supported. 
 Obtrusive issues (6 issues) Non-obtrusive issues (13 issues) 
 # of significant 
issues 
% of significant 
issues 
# of significant 
issues 
% of significant 
issues 
NH→PT 5 .833 7 .538 
NT→PT 3 .500 5 .385 
PT→NH 4 .667 3 .231 
PT→NT 4 .667 3 .231 
Table 4.10. Numbers and percentages of significant Granger causality tests between the 
media and the public agendas. 
 
Second, H6a-b asks about the two media characteristics. Table 4.11 summarizes 
the broken-down agenda-setting results. Overall, non-digital-native news tweets were 
found to have a balanced and stronger two-way agenda-setting relationship with personal 
tweets (both directions have 8 significant issues) than their digital-native counterparts. 
News headlines from digital-native and non-native media, however, performed similarly. 
Additionally, no consistent pattern was found in terms of the two-way agenda-setting 
effects across political orientations: While mainstream news headlines and news tweets 
set the agenda for personal tweets on slightly more issues than the other two types (NH 
→ PT: 6 issues; NT → PT: 8 issues), conservative media followed personal tweets a little 
bit more closely (PT → NH: 5 issues; PT → NT: 8 issues). None of the directions, 
however, meet the majority rule. Thus, H6a-b was rejected.  
Third, the final hypothesis inspects the influence of individual characteristics. To 
recap, the comparison was conducted by conducting Granger causality tests on various 
participant groups. In terms of demographic differences, the female, older, white, and 




(i.e., had more significant issues) with the two versions of the media agenda compared to 
their counterparts (see Table 4.12).  Specifically, only the news tweets to personal tweets 
direction showed a strong enough agenda-setting effect among females (12/19 significant 
issues), meaning that female users’ expressions on Twitter were more likely to be 
influenced by the media agenda represented by news tweets. The same level of strong 
agenda-setting was not found among any other gender groups or any other directions. 
Thus, gender was proved to be a contingent factor in at least the relationship between 
news and personal tweets. No directions met the majority rule when breaking down 
participants by age groups. Between white and non-white participants, only the former 
followed the agendas reflected in both news headlines and news tweets in their own 
tweets for a majority of social issues (both 10/19 issues). When it comes to household 
income, the lower-income group’s agenda was set by news tweets, but not news 
headlines (10/19 issues). The same effects did not stand for people with higher income. 
Finally, for education level, the well-educated group followed news headlines more 
closely while the lower-education group followed new tweets on more issues (12 out of 
the 19). Higher education level was also able to strengthen the reverse agenda-setting 
effects (see Table 4.12), although the effect seems to be minimal. H7a is thus supported.  
Finally, people with lower opinion leadership, no matter measured by the PS scale 
or the number of Twitter followers, had a stronger two-way agenda-setting relationship 
with the two media sources (see Table 4.13). A closer look can reveal that the traditional 
agenda-setting direction was found significant on the majority of issues (11 of the 19 




also marginally stronger among the group of lower opinion leadership, although none of 
the relationships achieved the majority of issues in the Granger causality tests. Likewise, 
those with lower social capital followed the news agenda more closely on most issues 
(NT → NH: 12/19 issues; NH → NT: 13/19 issues). Yet, in the reverse direction, the 
lower social capital group only set the agenda on slightly more issues (8/19 issues) than 
the higher social capital group (4/19 issues) for news tweets, but not for news headlines, 
for which both groups had similar weak effects (lower social capital: 3/19 issues; higher 
social capital: 4/19 issues). As clear variations by people’s opinion leadership and social 






 Issue 1 Issue 2 Issue 3 Issue 4 Issue 5 Issue 6 Issue 7 Issue 8 Issue 9 Issue 10 
1. By whether digital-native Lag = 2 Lag = 4 Lag = 3 Lag = 2 Lag = 4 Lag = 2 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 
NH (digital-native)→ PT  .12 .19 21.55*** .91 .24 5.17* .90 1.71*** 5.38* 3.22† 
NH (non-digital-native)→PT  2.80† 5.47 31.76*** .41 4.29* 6.00* 2.32 5.94* .62 91.90*** 
NT (digital-native)→PT  .03 3.00 .11 .17 .92 .48 1.26 4.72* .12 1.49 
NT (non-digital-native)→PT  .13 12.52 9.41** 5.11* 49.18*** 4.58* 2.53 16.66*** 2.72† 1.43 
PT→NH (digital-native)  .14 .09 1.92*** 1.00 .02 3.10† .05 9.97** 2.45 1.05 
PT→NH (non-digital-native)  .00 .64 14.41*** .88 12.79*** 6.84** .98 2.69 3.80† 1.70 
PT→NT (digital-native)  .33 .04 1.97 1.32 2.85† .00 1.54 12.87*** .00 18.61*** 
PT→NT (non-digital-native)  1.78 .02 9.14** .70 1.65 6.41* 1.31 22.18*** 1.58 7.91** 
2. By political orientation Lag = 2 Lag = 2 Lag = 2 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 Lag = 1 Lag = 2 Lag = 2 Lag = 4 Lag = 3 
NH (mainstream)→ PT  3.48† .34 25.62*** .10 1.17 4.27* 2.10 9.12** 1.49 73.69*** 
NH (conservative)→PT  .15 .17 18.85*** .43 11.20*** .00 1.02 11.24*** 2.11 7.56** 
NH (liberal)→PT  .17 .08 2.89*** 1.49 5.07* .60 .37 4.82* .43 .75 
NT (mainstream)→ PT  .08 3.25† 11.97*** 7.78** 17.20*** 6.99** 6.69** 11.76*** 1.21 1.05 
NT (conservative)→PT  1.21*** 31.42*** 1.10 1.71 14.07*** .12 .16 16.75*** 1.21 18.53*** 
NT (liberal)→PT  .70 3.20† .03 .60 1.50 .35 1.90 5.21* .16 1.17 
PT→NH (mainstream)  .54 2.95† 27.87*** 1.71 .30 .07 .71 9.64** 1.60 11.81*** 
PT→NH (conservative)  1.10 1.73 18.90*** .02 4.37* .42 .01 12.89*** .13 .11 
PT→NH (liberal)  2.44 .00 9.80** .10 .01 .72 .00 .85 1.77 .26 
PT→NT (mainstream)  .14 .90 14.79*** .38 .37 5.06* 1.93 11.76*** .85 .87 
PT→NT (conservative)  .25 .07 .07 9.73** 15.14*** 11.08** 2.09 21.51*** .66 19.49*** 
PT→NT (liberal)  6.25* 1.35 8.23** .76 7.44** .01 .01 3.29† .20 4.17* 
Table 4.11. Granger causality Wald test results between the personal tweets and media with different characteristics (issue 1-10). 






 Issue 11 Issue 12 Issue 13 Issue 14 Issue 15 Issue 16 Issue 17 Issue 18 Issue 19 Count 
1. By whether digital-native Lag = 1 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 Lag = 1 Lag = 2 Lag = 4 Lag = 1 Lag = 3 Lag = 1  
NH (digital-native)→ PT  .60 3.84* 1.44 .29 .09 .00 1.04 1.79 .01 6 
NH (non-digital-native)→PT  3.40† 8.34** .90 2.60 .67 2.56 1.88 .60 3.61† 6 
NT (digital-native)→PT  1.39 2.89† .05 1.58 1.00 1.93 6.50* 1.54 .65 2 
NT (non-digital-native)→PT  .01 4.37*** .12 3.65† .08 3.27*** 1.42 44.19*** .92 8 
PT→NH (digital-native)  .43 6.37* .08 .11 .13 2.27 .09 .80 1.39 3 
PT→NH (non-digital-native)  .36 2.89† .69 .47 1.28 .01 .14 5.92* .00 4 
PT→NT (digital-native)  .82 .70 .01 1.20 .62 .37 3.43† 1.50 .81 2 
PT→NT (non-digital-native)  2.05 13.62*** .91 11.26*** .04 15.69*** 1.56 16.78*** 1.00 8 
2. By political orientation Lag = 1 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 Lag = 1 Lag = 2 Lag = 6 Lag = 1 Lag = 2 Lag = 1  
NH (mainstream)→ PT  5.43* 12.79*** .53 4.46 1.13 2.49 .02 .01 2.60 6 
NH (conservative)→PT  .01 1.72 .64 .16 .02 7.27** .03 .03 .29 5 
NH (liberal)→PT  .33 .27 1.37 1.60 .09 2.36 5.36* 14.19*** .04 5 
NT (mainstream)→ PT  .27 39.98*** .01 3.80† .00 7.21** 2.01 1.59*** 1.46 8 
NT (conservative)→PT  .03 3.63† .31 .34 .69 3.10 .04 4.13* .20 6 
NT (liberal)→PT  .01 .28 .54 .72 1.17 6.82** 4.10* 5.12* 1.87 4 
PT→NH (mainstream)  1.27 3.68† 1.43 1.62 .56 .72 .63 2.23 .63 3 
PT→NH (conservative)  .00 3.88* .21 .09 6.15* .59 1.67 3.40† .51 5 
PT→NH (liberal)  .30 .69 .19 .42 .01 .31 .20 7.96** .78 2 
PT→NT (mainstream)  1.26 11.04*** .51 12.20*** .42 17.53*** .68 7.23** .66 7 
PT→NT (conservative)  1.04 2.42 .66 .09 13.01*** 15.81*** .62 12.96*** 1.15 8 
PT→NT (liberal)  .98 1.42 .08 .85 3.04† 29.79*** 9.82** 4.63* .91 7 
Table 4.11 (cont.). Granger causality Wald test results between the personal tweets and media with different characteristics (issue 
11-19) 






 Issue 1 Issue 2 Issue 3 Issue 4 Issue 5 Issue 6 Issue 7 Issue 8 Issue 9 Issue 10 
1. By gender Lag = 2 Lag = 4 Lag = 3 Lag = 2 Lag = 4 Lag = 2 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 
NH→PT (males) 3.78† 5.77* 22.79*** .04 28.63*** 5.66* 1.11 .42 .92 17.76*** 
NT→PT (males) 4.86* 2.93*** .57 6.55** 3.17† 2.85† .50 .05 7.39** 19.95*** 
NH→PT (females) .04 .38 47.29*** .60 .15 5.52* 2.29 19.09*** .19 189.80*** 
NT→PT (females) 14.18*** .07 15.26*** .20 1.90 3.02* 5.41* 39.01*** 4.71* 44.50*** 
NH→PT (other) 1.10 3.49† .00 .13 3.51† 3.01† 8.77** 6.26* 1.51 32.72*** 
NT→PT (other) 1.41 1.03 1.38 2.34 5.23* 5.14* 1.04 6.47* .74 12.96*** 
PT (males) →NH .39 4.39* 2.04 1.82 21.86*** 11.36*** 2.34 1.30 7.71** 1.55 
PT (females) →NH 3.46 7.00** 33.66*** .13 .93 1.15 .71 8.20** .21 7.66** 
PT (other) →NH .59 .01 .00 2.11 3.48† .12 2.59 1.36 .41 5.37* 
PT (males) →NT .29 .17 3.01† 1.23 .00 2.24 .03 .50 3.20† 8.40** 
PT (females) →NT 12.02*** .15 8.44** .06 2.24 2.45 5.25* 45.53*** 2.96† 2.01 
PT (other) →NT 3.30† .53 .04 .23 1.71*** .20 1.03 2.48 .31 2.78† 
2. By age Lag = 4 Lag = 5 Lag = 3 Lag = 3 Lag = 4 Lag = 4 Lag = 4 Lag = 5 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 
NH→PT (older) 14.58*** 18.91*** 43.29*** .21 2.00 3.13† 4.78* 17.53*** .35 81.23*** 
NT→PT (older) 1.14 2.65 1.92*** 2.48 41.16*** 9.20** .75 56.67*** 2.01 3.66† 
NH→PT (younger) .86 .06 1.51*** 1.42 .00 8.86** 1.69 4.43* 7.16** 9.40** 
NT→PT (younger) .77 4.05* 1.04 2.03 .32 5.31* 2.11 12.67*** 6.48* 3.13† 
PT (older) →NH 1.40 .44 17.64*** .40 9.43** .43 .28 14.00*** 4.53* 2.36 
PT (younger) →NH .10 8.44** 1.95 6.25* 1.71 15.12*** 28.73*** 11.10*** 1.10 .08 
PT (older) →NT .05 1.05 1.43*** 2.84† 1.23 3.61† .74 2.16*** .00 7.62** 
PT (younger) →NT .05 .00 5.29* .17 .37 4.52* 1.73 6.18** .02 .78 
3. By race Lag = 4 Lag = 5 Lag = 3 Lag = 4 Lag = 4 Lag = 3 Lag = 4 Lag = 5 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 
NH→PT (white) 16.80*** 24.57*** 48.36*** 2.28 .50 .59 5.41* 25.96*** .21 7.90*** 
NT→PT (white) 1.31 2.18 1.49*** 12.15*** 35.24*** 3.54† 1.84 56.14*** 5.62* 9.97** 
NH→PT (non-white) .11 .02 14.19*** 41.74*** 11.09*** 9.76** 3.97* 8.06** .26 43.21*** 






PT (white) →NH 1.17 1.13 12.46*** 2.09 1.32*** 3.38† .39 2.36*** 5.77* 3.63† 
PT (non-white) →NH .45 4.66* 7.23** 2.81† .49 .64 .31 .22 .66 2.91† 
PT (white) →NT 1.07 .00 7.57** 4.85* 2.61 2.03 1.10 26.00*** .00 7.75** 
PT (non-white) →NT 2.10 1.11 1.78 .14 1.16 .02 .78 11.33*** 4.21* 2.23 
4. By household income Lag = 4 Lag = 4 Lag = 3 Lag = 4 Lag = 4 Lag = 3 Lag = 4 Lag = 5 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 
NH→PT (higher income) 18.67*** 1.16 42.25*** .03 2.08 .54 1.10 16.73*** .15 45.80*** 
NT→PT (higher income) 1.16 13.95*** 12.20*** .55 33.71*** 5.63* 2.49 21.76*** 3.60† 6.82** 
NH→PT (lower income) 1.22 6.41* 26.29*** .04 3.07† 8.46** 1.21*** 14.66*** 2.67 62.45*** 
NT→PT (lower income) 6.28* 4.48* 1.82 5.23* 7.64** .52 5.69* 29.44*** .03 2.57 
PT (higher income) →NH 1.10 .12 7.43** .14 2.25 .07 .48 11.23*** 3.11† 4.14* 
PT (lower income) →NH .52 2.52 11.91*** .23 8.91*** .39 .24 1.88 3.13† 1.58 
PT (higher income) →NT .06 .00 .49 4.27* 5.80* 1.68 .53 8.56** .27 2.82† 
PT (lower income) →NT .65 .07 1.98*** .11 .06 .06 6.68** 22.17*** 1.17 8.25** 
5. By education level Lag = 4 Lag = 4 Lag = 3 Lag = 4 Lag = 4 Lag = 4 Lag = 4 Lag = 5 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 
NH→PT (higher education level) 7.89** 4.62* 38.92*** 21.43*** 2.03 11.89*** 5.13* 22.54*** 5.18* 73.91*** 
NT→PT (higher education level) 3.39† 3.36† 3.86*** 5.23* 2.74*** 17.42*** .11 45.84*** 1.96 2.48 
NH→PT (lower education level) 6.93** 1.36 24.13*** .81 3.04† 1.13 4.46* 11.41*** 1.77 36.29*** 
NT→PT (lower education level) 8.99** 17.230*** .16 7.25** 16.90*** 5.19* 2.98† 16.08*** .69 5.76* 
PT (higher education level) →NH 2.50 .01 18.14*** 1.32 .98 2.37*** .23 24.83*** .01 2.92† 
PT (lower education level) →NH .05 1.03 5.63* 1.90 12.14*** 1.25 .56 .23 11.24*** 3.00† 
PT (higher education level) →NT .75 .39 1.54*** 1.48 2.62 9.66** .57 31.81*** 1.75 5.30* 
PT (lower education level) →NT 1.80 .91 2.12 2.94† 1.23 2.81† 1.63 1.53*** .05 5.11* 
Table 4.12. Granger causality Wald test results between the media agenda and social groups with different demographics (issue 1-
10). 









 Issue 11 Issue 12 Issue 13 Issue 14 Issue 15 Issue 16 Issue 17 Issue 18 Issue 19 
Count 
1. By gender Lag = 1 Lag = 4 Lag = 2 Lag = 1 Lag = 2 Lag = 6 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 Lag = 1 
NH→PT (males) 3.92* 1.87 .13 6.44* .22 .20 .81 .61 3.23† 7 
NT→PT (males) .33 1.19 .07 12.82*** .54 9.63** .62 29.99*** .63 8 
NH→PT (females) .08 26.50*** 3.12† 5.45* 1.73 .74 .08 4.55* .26 7 
NT→PT (females) .17 86.58*** .51 4.61* 1.25 18.59*** 17.53*** 18.53*** .01 12 
NH→PT (other) 3.17† .82 .10 .53 .13 .60 7.00** .17 .09 4 
NT→PT (other) .39 1.22 .11 1.16 .73 .52 1.32 .61 .81 4 
PT (males) →NH .27 .55 .50 1.65 .25 .27 3.23† 5.41* 3.49† 5 
PT (females) →NH .63 6.76** .11 .97 1.46 5.26* .28 .28 3.38† 6 
PT (other) →NH .23 3.60† 3.06** .82 1.65 2.97† .11 2.03 .25 2 
PT (males) →NT .72 1.16 .98 16.58*** .20 1.44 1.57 8.22** 3.33† 3 
PT (females) →NT 4.24* 55.22*** .09 .10 .53 8.96** 4.94* 17.83*** .01 9 
PT (other) →NT .39 1.98 2.39 .01 1.36 1.24 1.06 .83 .97 1 
2. By age Lag = 1 Lag = 4 Lag = 1 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 Lag = 5 Lag = 2 Lag = 4 Lag = 1  
NH→PT (older) 7.65** 7.69** .10 3.17† 1.62 1.40 .25 4.98* .20 9 
NT→PT (older) .77 .77 .29 14.21*** 2.06 52.13*** 14.38*** 41.13*** .53 8 
NH→PT (younger) .02 .03 .49 .24 .00 2.42 .14 .27 2.82† 5 
NT→PT (younger) .29 1.99 5.90* 3.00† .04 6.06* .04 1.69*** 1.60 7 
PT (older) →NH 1.34 1.29 .17 1.47 .51 6.46* 7.92** 4.37* .86 7 
PT (younger) →NH .24 .74 2.85† 1.54 .10 .07 .14 .23 .86 5 
PT (older) →NT 1.48 1.38 2.85† 3.55† .17 1.72*** 8.42** 6.47* .06 6 
PT (younger) →NT 1.74 .23 .64 .18 1.08 4.28* 1.70 1.99 3.40† 4 
3. By race Lag = 1 Lag = 4 Lag = 3 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 Lag = 6 Lag = 2 Lag = 4 Lag = 1  
NH→PT (white) 5.47* 9.38** 2.97 2.46 .63 2.03 2.01 4.86* 4.51* 10 
NT→PT (white) .64 18.18*** 1.36 .97 .64 29.40*** 1.36*** 45.96*** .10 10 
NH→PT (non-white) .04 2.55 .00 .79 1.28 .06 .02 2.81† .12 7 







PT (white) →NH .63 .47 .48 .61 .60 5.50* 1.44 3.97* 1.63 6 
PT (non-white) →NH .06 3.88* .24 .01 .02 .53 1.54 .31 1.08 3 
PT (white) →NT 1.57 4.76* .00 3.41† .19 8.51** 5.22* 7.17** 1.63 8 
PT (non-white) →NT 1.31 14.12*** 1.44 .53 .07 2.20 .98 1.27 .21 3 
4. By household income Lag = 1 Lag = 4 Lag = 3 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 Lag = 6 Lag = 2 Lag = 4 Lag = 1  
NH→PT (higher income) .01 3.58† .16 4.16* 1.84 .39 .33 5.16* .29 6 
NT→PT (higher income) .09 2.96† .03 14.73*** 2.15 11.95*** 2.56 29.53*** .74 9 
NH→PT (lower income) 8.95** 9.87** 3.55† .26 .21 .09 6.46* 2.43 3.00† 9 
NT→PT (lower income) .18 39.72*** .14 .68 .73 2.89*** 12.77*** 17.52*** 1.96 10 
PT (higher income) →NH .22 .42 .55 .00 2.14 2.99† 5.77* .72 .30 4 
PT (lower income) →NH .45 12.73*** .27 1.02 .13 1.91 .13 4.67* .04 4 
PT (higher income) →NT 1.37 5.19* 1.91 .00 .36 .50 3.55† 1.70 4.71* 5 
PT (lower income) →NT 1.45 11.45*** .00 7.62** .01 9.11** 2.51 9.16** .06 8 
5. By education level Lag = 1 Lag = 4 Lag = 3 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 Lag = 6 Lag = 2 Lag = 4 Lag = 1  
NH→PT (higher education level) .38 1.81 .01 .23 2.13 4.51 .83 4.43* 1.01 10 
NT→PT (higher education level) .02 31.69*** .00 2.98† 1.59 28.87* 5.27* 31.37*** 2.07 9 
NH→PT (lower education level) 6.17** 11.85*** 2.89† 3.46† .08 .51 .44 3.21† 1.92 7 
NT→PT (lower education level) .57 3.76* .07 6.98** .92 11.76*** 7.17** 15.90*** 3.11† 12 
PT (higher education level) →NH .29 1.34 .00 .00 .47 7.64** 7.97** .12 .58 5 
PT (lower education level) →NH .35 1.40 1.10 .88 .07 .51 .22 6.37** .00 4 
PT (higher education level) →NT 2.40 8.01** 3.80† .48 .38 6.18* 7.31** 1.83 2.35 7 
PT (lower education level) →NT .59 7.23** .13 3.82 1.00 3.94* .50 7.44** .18 5 
Table 4.12 (cont.). Granger causality Wald test results between the media agenda and social groups with different demographics 
(issue 11-19). 








 Issue 1 Issue 2 Issue 3 Issue 4 Issue 5 Issue 6 Issue 7 Issue 8 Issue 9 Issue 10 
1. By PS Lag = 4 Lag = 5 Lag = 3 Lag = 4 Lag = 4 Lag = 3 Lag = 4 Lag = 3 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 
NH→PT (higher PS) .63 .02 39.22*** 3.48† .46 8.80** 5.03* .42 3.63† 62.97 
NT→PT (higher PS) 1.83 1.82 .03 .11 .53 2.04 1.97 5.84* 4.64* 55.31 
NH→PT (lower PS) 17.02*** 2.13*** 38.90**** .19 4.64* 5.83* 6.44* 16.56*** .05 84.69 
NT→PT (lower PS) 4.47* 2.32 7.35** 5.10* 4.12*** 1.83 .09 19.57*** .58 6.30* 
PT (higher PS) →NH .05 8.02** 27.16*** .56 1.86 .26 .05 3.06† 2.39 8.13** 
PT (lower PS) →NH 1.86 .33 12.15*** .02 8.04** .15 .64 5.75* 3.90* 3.39† 
PT (higher PS) →NT .02 .25 2.88† 1.57 .98 1.07 4.46* 11.95*** .57 .06 
PT (lower PS) →NT .11 .21 8.63** 3.35 5.15* .32 .68 19.69*** .66 9.36** 
2. By followers Lag = 4 Lag = 4 Lag = 3 Lag = 3 Lag = 4 Lag = 3 Lag = 4 Lag = 3 Lag = 1 Lag = 3 
NH→PT (more followers) .44 1.99 .09 2.43 2.22 .43 .96 .29 .40 12.14*** 
NT→PT (more followers) .05 8.21** .99 1.58 .13 .24 1.20 .20 1.51 11.65*** 
NH→PT (less followers) 15.52*** 5.67* 55.44*** .04 4.54* 11.56*** 1.96*** 15.12*** 3.39† 11.01*** 
NT→PT (less followers) 1.04 17.72*** 8.75** 4.91* 39.65*** 2.32 .22 25.73*** 1.36 1.32 
PT (more followers) →NH .10 .19 .13 .88 .24 .95 .07 .20 .83 12.73*** 
PT (less followers) →NH 1.60 .36 22.54*** .00 9.38** .02 .80 9.21** .37 4.97* 
PT (more followers) →NT .10 1.67 1.61 3.57† .02 .02 .40 .66 .26 .29 
PT (less followers) →NT .11 .02 11.25*** 2.92† 3.55† .55 2.26 29.75*** .35 9.30** 
3. By social capital Lag = 4 Lag = 4 Lag = 3 Lag = 4 Lag = 4 Lag = 3 Lag = 4 Lag = 3 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 
NH→PT (higher SC) .76 1.31 8.06** 1.42 .26 8.10** 11.00*** 5.64* 93.13*** .01 
NT→PT (higher SC) 4.06* .10 .05 .81 .00 .34 15.46*** 3.67† 79.67*** .13 
NH→PT (lower SC) 15.85*** 7.75** 49.09*** .11 4.59* 5.88* 8.39** .15 79.26*** 5.14* 
NT→PT (lower SC) 5.02* 18.64 8.66** 5.40* 42.55*** 2.31 14.09** .85 7.22** .45 
PT (higher SC) →NH .36 .66 12.77*** .02 .01 .77 21.57*** 3.99* 18.59*** .14 
PT (lower SC) →NH 1.20 .17 16.57*** .01 1.14*** .43 2.15 3.17† 2.92† 1.09 
PT (higher SC) →NT .28 1.58 5.42* .17 1.45 .23 8.31** .05 .00 1.14 
PT (lower SC) →NT .01 .27 8.26** 2.77† 5.21* .73 23.24*** 1.08 9.53† 1.76 
Table 4.13. Granger causality Wald test results between the media agenda and social groups with different levels of opinion 
leadership and social capital (issue 1-10). 







 Issue 11 Issue 12 Issue 13 Issue 14 Issue 15 Issue 16 Issue 17 Issue 18 Issue 19 Count 
1. By PS Lag = 1 Lag = 4 Lag = 3 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 Lag = 6 Lag = 2 Lag = 4 Lag = 1  
NH→PT (higher PS) .04 1.07 .24 .67 2.06 7.91** .11 2.34 .87 4 
NT→PT (higher PS) .01 2.06 7.41** .00 .98 7.32** .13 1.10*** .22 5 
NH→PT (lower PS) 6.04* 1.97*** 2.70 5.26* .97 .13 1.11 6.20* 1.87 11 
NT→PT (lower PS) .19 26.73*** .53 12.38*** 2.09 27.21*** 14.57*** 39.85*** .64 11 
PT (higher PS) →NH .23 .00 1.16 2.49*** .22 .01 .37 .00 1.52 4 
PT (lower PS) →NH 1.26 3.30† .22 1.79 .34 4.72* 2.53 3.99* .04 6 
PT (higher PS) →NT 1.46 .87 4.20* 1.04 2.72† .85 3.63† 6.96** 9.79** 5 
PT (lower PS) →NT 1.57 14.62*** .00 5.98* .00 8.07** 2.91† 5.46* .25 8 
2. By followers Lag = 1 Lag = 4 Lag = 3 Lag = 2 Lag = 4 Lag = 6 Lag = 2 Lag = 4 Lag = 1  
NH→PT (more followers) .44 .10 6.87** .57 1.00 .05 1.42 .16 .23 3 
NT→PT (more followers) .96 .03 .46 .35 .50 .73 .33 1.08 .16 2 
NH→PT (less followers) 4.71* 12.04*** 1.32 3.73† 1.11 .22 1.08 7.77** 2.60 11 
NT→PT (less followers) .20 28.26*** .02 1.69*** 2.18 32.05*** 11.94*** 47.37*** .20 11 
PT (more followers) →NH .54 .05 1.14 2.43 .45 9.63** .35 13.79*** .36 3 
PT (less followers) →NH .66 2.64 .60 .45 .65 3.40 2.69 3.69† .24 4 
PT (more followers) →NT .80 1.32* .13 .01 .07 .22 .51 .03 .04 1 
PT (less followers) →NT 2.85† 15.48*** .53 3.86* .13 9.08** 5.69* 8.05** 1.80 8 
3. By social capital Lag = 1 Lag = 4 Lag = 6 Lag = 2 Lag = 3 Lag = 6 Lag = 2 Lag = 4 Lag = 1  
NH→PT (higher SC) 4.77* 4.77* 2.78† 1.31 2.19 18.73*** .18 1.51 1.31 8 
NT→PT (higher SC) 1.91 1.91 .72 3.83* 2.37 2.06 .85 4.74* .04 5 
NH→PT (lower SC) 7.91** 7.91** 18.88*** 5.41* 2.02 .40 1.14 6.98** 1.60 13 
NT→PT (lower SC) 26.37*** 26.37*** .45 17.01*** 1.96 31.25*** 12.52*** 43.60*** .09 12 
PT (higher SC) →NH .01 .01 .52 1.41 1.32 .65 1.47 2.36 .67 4 
PT (lower SC) →NH 2.99† 2.99† 1.30 1.30 2.02 3.59† 1.48 4.81* .00 3 
PT (higher SC) →NT 2.60 2.60 .01 1.79 .14 .53 5.10* 1.97 6.69*** 4 
PT (lower SC) →NT 12.46* 12.46*** .22 6.09* .12 8.33** 2.12 9.36** .14 8 
Table 4.13 (cont.). Granger causality Wald test results between the media agenda and social groups with different levels of opinion 
leadership and social capital (issue 11-19). 




CHAPTER 5 Discussion 
Building on the agenda-setting theory, public opinion research, and political 
expression literature, this dissertation theorizes and empirically examines a multi-version 
two-way agenda-setting framework, which has three claims: (1) the two versions of 
public agenda are distinctive from each other; (2) the two versions of media agenda are 
highly connected yet differentiate on some specific issues; and (3) mutual agenda-setting 
relationships exist between the social media public agenda and the two forms of media 
agenda, with the traditional direction stronger than the reverse. Based on four matched 
datasets collected during the 2020 US presidential election period — a representative 
survey among Twitter users, their personal tweets, headlines on news websites, and the 
news tweets published on the corresponding news organizations’ accounts — this 
dissertation also examines how issue-, individual-, media-level factors could moderate 
the three features. 
5.1 The Multi-version Agendas 
5.1.1 Divergent Public Agendas 
This dissertation first challenged an assumption in the traditional agenda-setting 
theory — there is only one unified public agenda. Analysis results based on a 
representative survey and tracking data of 854 Twitter users showed that the two 
commonly used operationalizations of the public agenda — the self-reported issue 
importance and the frequency of SNS expression — presented very distinctive agendas at 
both the aggregate level and issue level. The issue-level analyses showed that out of the 




personal issues (i.e., issue 14 religion/morality and issue 19 LGBT rights). As indicated 
by the top issues, the self-reported public agenda tended to prioritize issues that are 
relevant to the daily life of all members of the society, whereas the SNS version of the 
public agenda focused on more controversial issues, such as politics, racism, and 
immigration, which are also more established political issues.  
Additionally, this paper also explored a potential factor behind the difference 
between “what people think” and “what people tweet” — self-censorship. The results, 
however, indicated that WTSC, a commonly used construct to measure self-censorship as 
a personal trait, did not sufficiently explain the differences between the two versions of 
public agenda. Only on two more politically sensitive issues (issue 4 Foreign trade/policy 
and issue 10 Politics/Government) that people with higher WTSC were less likely to 
speak out on social media even if they indicated that the issues were important in the 
survey. Neither of the moderating effects was statistically significant if using a .05 cutoff 
line. 
The insignificant results can be attributed to multiple reasons. First, 
operationalizing self-censorship as a personal characteristic activated in a face-to-face 
setting when facing a known group of audiences, like what Hayes et al. (2005) did, may 
not be applicable anymore to the computer-mediated communication environment on 
SNSs, where people’s expression is constrained by technological affordances and their 
audiences more fluid. For instance, Das and Kramer (2013) found that for Facebook 
users, their motives of self-censoring are not limited to those related to fear of isolation, 




constraints. On SNSs, the obscured nature of the viewership and the high searchability of 
content lead to “context collapse,” meaning that different social contexts can overlap 
(Marwick & boyd, 2011). In this case, it is difficult for users to have an accurate 
estimation of the audiences’ view and self-censor accordingly. Thus, we should expect 
that when SNS users are deciding what to post on the public or semi-public SNS 
platforms, other heuristics are also at work. Future research should expand the 
theorization and operationalization of self-censorship to take both the technological 
aspects (e.g., platform affordances and platform moderation) and other social heuristics 
(e.g., community norms and consistency of self-presentation) into consideration.  
Second, the two versions of the agenda have divergent theoretical meanings: 
While the MIP questions ask about the most important issues to the society, the SNS 
expressions might be a closer reflection of the most important issues to oneself (Zhang et 
al., 2012). As introduced in Chapter 3, the year 2020 was largely defined by the COVID-
19 pandemic, which raised huge concerns about people’s health and heavily struck the 
economy and job market. Thus, it is natural that these three were among the most 
important issues in the survey: When the target audiences are not one’s contacts, the 
participants are likely to think about issues that are not just relevant to themselves, but 
will impact the majority of the population, even if some participants might not be, say, 
unemployed. On the other hand, SNSs expressions are essentially a performance and a 
process of constructing one’s networked identity (Papacharissi, 2013). Therefore, when 
choosing what issues to express opinions about on SNSs, people may not necessarily pick 




presentation. The differences displayed in Table 4.2 also showed that the top issues (e.g., 
healthcare, unemployment, economy, and education) in the survey version are relatively 
more obtrusive, or more relevant to lay people’s daily life. The most discussed issues 
among personal tweets, on the contrary, are less obtrusive to the majority of the 
population. Issues such as race, politics, and immigration, for many people, cannot be 
directly experienced in their everyday life. While this dissertation did not indicate a 
“better” version of the public agenda, I do want to encourage future researchers and 
journalists to recognize and carefully differentiate the theoretical values of both versions. 
For instance, future studies could try to empirically test whether issue obtrusiveness is a 
factor behind the discrepancies.  
Third, an individual-level analysis may not be adequate to compare the two 
versions of the agenda. Although the participants responded to the survey independently, 
their SNS behaviors were largely influenced by other actors in their networks. SNS users 
will respond to their friends, comment on news tweets, express opinions on “trending” 
topics2, or participate in hashtag activisms. These interactions, on the one hand, will 
inflate the amount of discussion around issues that are more “commentable,” just as what 
Rogstad (2016) found in their study. Controversial issues, such as politics and racism, are 
more likely to initiate conversations, compared to those that are more fact-based or 
require professional knowledge to debate on (e.g., economy and military). On the other 
 
2 Trending topics here refers to topics on Twitter Trends, a list of topics that are popular in that 
moment. Twitter’s algorithm determines Trends for each user based on their followings, location, and 
interests. Therefore, different users might be exposed to different Trends (Twitter Trends FAQ – 




hand, the networked nature of SNS expressions enables strategic and organized inflation 
of certain issues, which has been used as a tool of many online activisms (Bennett & 
Segerberg, 2012). When Twitter is flooded with similar content by several or even one 
user(s), it does not make sense to use these posts to represent what is regarded as 
important among the wider population. Therefore, I call for further data cleaning and 
network-level analyses, so that we can capture individuals’ opinions if they are not 
affected by network factors and compare this processed version of agenda to the survey 
results. The following table summarizes the differences between the two versions of 
agenda. 
 
 Survey version SNS version 
Population Traditionally more 
accessible survey 
population 
Population with higher 
socioeconomic status and 
better Internet skills 
Theoretical meaning Socially important issues Personally important issues 
Mode of communication One direction 
communication 
Interactive communication 
Target audiences The researchers SNS friends/strangers 
Issue preferences Issues that impact more 
people’s life 




Response rate, sampling 
biases, survey design, and 
social desirability, etc. 
Data collection channels, 
platform moderation, self-
presentation strategies, and 
other actors and activisms, etc. 





Last but not least, platform moderation might be another unexamined factor 
behind the gap between the two public agendas. Not all published SNS posts can be 
observed and collected by researchers and journalists. Gillespie (2018) pointed out that 
SNS platforms, including Twitter, moderate the overall agenda by removing or filtering 
posts that do not meet the community guidelines, which are sometimes problematic and 
constantly changing. SNS data collected via various channels, including APIs and third-
party platforms, may also present different agendas compared to data collected through 
full access (i.e., the “fire hose”), as they might use different sampling strategies that are 
unknown to the public (Lomborg & Bechmann, 2014). These problems can partially be 
avoided in this study because I collected the data almost instantly after the participants 
filled the survey without any sampling. However, platform censorship can still happen in 
between the original posting time and data collection time. Some researchers (e.g., Chen 
et al., 2021) have begun to examine the statistical comparability across various data 
sources. To the author’s knowledge, no studies yet have compared the content analysis 
results of public agendas when using different SNS data collection conduits. Given that 
news organizations are using various data analytical platforms to understand the social 
media public opinion (McGregor, 2019), one important direction of future research is to 
empirically inspect how the data collection and presentation methods of those platforms 
would potential bias journalists’ understanding of the public agenda, and to what extent 
they would deviate from the self-reported issue importance among the public. 
These discrepancies provide an alert to public opinion researchers and journalists 




opinion flection is the foundation of a well-informed citizenry (Dahl, 2020). The 
journalistic reporting on public opinion also provides citizens some basic understanding 
of the opinion environment, which can lead to either spiral of silence or more courage to 
speak out (Noelle-Neumann, 1993). Thus, even though SNS data is easy to access and 
analyze, especially for newsrooms that require high timeliness, journalists should be extra 
cautious when interpreting the results as the public agenda and provide full information 
about the potential biases introduced by the aspects mentioned above. For instance, they 
should try to identify organized and/or repeated posting and understand how social 
activisms and other actors would bias the results presented on social media analytical 
platforms. Journalists should also be careful about the description they use when citing 
the SNS public agenda: Instead of saying “the public believes” or “this is the opinion of 
the public,” they should use more rigorous phrases like “a sample of Twitter users 
expressed” or “this is the opinion of Facebook users with specific characteristics.” 
One final note is that, with the popularity of using SNSs to reflect public opinion 
in journalism and other industries, the two versions of public agenda might also be more 
and more interconnected: If people believe that their social media expressions will be 
picked up by journalists, they might intentionally post more about issues that they believe 
should be highlighted (e.g., repeat posts/organized mass posting). The realization of the 
potential audiences among ordinary users may disproportionally increase or decrease the 
salience of certain issues. Future research could further investigate this trend by 
interviewing people about their posting intentions and conducting longitudinal studies on 




Overall, the results of this dissertation revealed that what people tweet cannot be 
simply equated to what people think. This key finding also provides us a normative 
warning: While the early social media researchers celebrated their democratization 
potential via civic deliberation (e.g., Papacharissi, 2002; Yang, 2009), the results here 
indicated that social media are not the wonderland that we imaged. If the conversation is 
the soul of democracy, just as Shah (2016) argued, then it is important to figure out what 
prevents us from talking about issues that we believe are important. As this study 
examined a discrete group of participants and only focused on one platform, we are 
unable to tell whether the differences were due to the opinion environment that one 
experiences or due to technical difficulties. Future research should carefully distinguish 
“we do not want to talk about these issues” and “we cannot talk about these issues” when 
exploring the public opinion biases on social media.  
 
5.1.2 Similar Media Agendas 
While the two versions of the public agenda largely diverged from each other, this 
dissertation revealed high alignment between the two versions of the media agenda at the 
aggregate level and issue level. Besides the high correlation, the findings also 
demonstrated mutual Granger causality results on 15 of 19 issues and one-way 
relationships on 3 of 19 issues. That is to say, the high similarity was not found only on 
issue 9 (immigration), which was a less covered issue. As for the three issues (11 
(terrorism), 13 (drugs), 19 (LGBT rights) on which only news headlines on the websites 




websites normally publish more items than the corresponding Twitter accounts (see 
section 2.3.1). The three issues, as shown in Table 4.5 (p. 84), are also among the less 
reported issues.  
The close connection between the two versions can reflect the increasingly tighter 
and higher-level collaboration of the news production team and social media team in 
newsrooms. Earlier observations (e.g., Elizabeth, 2017; Gleason, 2010; Ju et al., 2014) 
illustrated that social media editors still could not organically integrate into many 
newsrooms. When news organizations started to extend their online presence to SNSs, we 
could see a high level of agenda alignment between their websites and social media 
accounts, because newsrooms back then simply duplicate all headlines from the websites 
indiscriminately most of the time (Armstrong & Gao, 2010). It is worth noting that the 
high correspondence still holds today when social media content has been largely 
diversified. From a preliminary observation of the news tweets dataset used in this study, 
I found that news organizations mainly tweeted in five different forms: (1) headlines and 
URLs, (2) snippets of website articles, (3) quotes from website articles, (4) interactive 
content to engage users, and (5) traffic-driving posts. Examples of the five types can be 





News tweets type Example 
Headlines and URLs Officer hit by bullet during "ambush" actually shot 
himself, say police https://t.co/ONkYaiUJEm 
Snippets of website articles A Florida teacher's aide who was dedicated to 
working with special needs students, and her brother, 
a paramedic, died from the coronavirus one day 
apart, their father said in a series of Facebook posts. 
https://t.co/1mnXo1cX0y 
Quotes from website articles "Economic inequality costs the average working 
person $42,000 annually" (@TheHillOpinion) 
https://t.co/rHuHTP6MHS https://t.co/C8pIP3v4PL 
Interactive content  Caption this https://t.co/vnpvyLT1BD 
Traffic driving posts RT @USER This Thursday we'll be live streaming the 
#RNCConvention2020! DON'T MISS IT! 
#RNCCrowderStream https://t.co/uCmyaOjfiz 
Table 5.2. Five types of news tweets. 
 
Even with the statistically high similarity between the two media agendas, we 
could still see several discrepancies. For instance, issue 1 (general economy) and issue 2 
(unemployment/jobs) ranked high on news websites (ranked No.3 and No.8 respectively) 
but relatively low on Twitter (ranked No.7 and No.13 respectively). The differences 
might be because the two issues require more numbers and analyses. Thus, the website 
articles about them are harder to be transferred to short tweets.  
This dissertation also revealed that whether media is digital-native will affect the 
extent to which their two platforms assemble each other in terms of the issue salience. 
Opposing to the previous assumption, non-digital-native media actually had better 
alignment between the two versions of the agenda. Two potential reasons are behind this 




more independent social media team to create content that can fit the platform culture 
better, whereas social media teams in organizations that are based on traditional media 
forms only consist of editors who do not produce exclusive content. Thus, the latter’s 
SNS posting would have a higher dependency on their website agenda. Second, while 
legacy media tend to keep their social media presence professional, digital-native media 
normally present a less serious and more interactive/conversational persona. For example, 
@BreitbartNews would post tweets like “Here we go. https://t.co/3Rt1UXeWXy” and 
“Ummmm https://t.co/49ogYt77MQ.” A follow-up content analysis of the types, as well 
as a headline-level comparison, can help us to better understand why the two types of 
media were different from each other. 
5.2 The (Yet) Imbalanced Two-way Agenda-setting Relationships 
Finally, the dissertation proposed and empirically proved a two-way agenda-
setting framework. The results confirmed that the media agenda measured by headlines 
from news websites and the public agenda measured by personal tweets were connected 
on most issues — some sort of agenda-setting effect existed on 15 out 19 issues (see 
Table 4.8; pp. 86-87). Further, reciprocal effect was found on four issues, including issue 
3 (taxes), issue 5 (healthcare), issue 8 (race relations/racism), issue 10 
(politics/government). Between the media agenda measured by news tweets and personal 
tweets, the mutual agenda-setting relationship was found on 6 issues, which is slightly 
stronger than news headlines. These findings are consistent with the recent intermedia 
agenda-setting studies that examined the relationship between the agenda on SNSs, which 




2019; Harder et al., 2017; Vargo & Guo, 2017). These studies collectively presented a 
“bottom-up trend”: The traditionally elite legacy media were no longer the exclusive 
agenda-setters; They are increasingly following the agenda incubated in the participatory 
culture on SNSs.  
This dissertation develops this line of research by disentangling ordinary people’s 
expression from the hodgepodge of SNS actors, which include news media, politicians, 
celebrities, and other organizational actors. As discussed in Chapter 2, we should not 
simply analyze the agenda-setting relationship between the social media public and 
various news media under the existing frameworks of IAS or agenda-building, as the 
public is essentially different from media outlets or professional/organizational actors. I 
call for revitalizing the term “reverse agenda-setting,” the reverse salience transfer from 
the public to the media, to differentiate from the two frameworks mentioned above. This 
theoretical argument also should remind journalists to carefully distinguish different 
types of SNS accounts when using social media posts as public opinions, just as Zhang 
and Guo (2019) and Guo and Zhang (2020) suggested.  
A closer look at the results, however, revealed that the two agenda-setting 
directions — from the media to the public and the reverse — are relatively weak and 
imbalanced: Only the traditional agenda-setting effect of news headlines met the majority 
rule. The traditional direction is still stronger than the reverse for both versions of the 
media agenda. This pattern matches what Shehata and Stromback (2013) argued in their 
paper: We are not (yet) in a new era of minimal effect. When considering all types of 




terms of their perceived issue importance or their SNS expressions. I here suggest the 
future researchers conduct a systematic literature review of the effect sizes reported in 
studies that compared the two directions in the past years so that we can have a more 
thorough understanding of where the trend goes.   
Theoretically, this dissertation adds to the hybrid media system theory (Chadwick, 
2017) by emphasizing the ordinary users' role and by clarifying the information flow 
between individuals and news media. It also connects the agenda-setting theory with 
civic engagement literature by revealing an information cycle — A less discussed conduit 
of civic engagement revealed here is through the issue salience transfer from the 
accumulated SNS expressions to news media. From there, the “media power” of news 
organizations could help to transfer news coverage to policy changes (Couldry & Curran, 
2003). To sum, we understand and change the world that is constructed by ourselves and 
summarized by the news media. 
 
5.3 The differentiated agenda-setting power  
In addition to the general two-way relationships, this dissertation also took a step 
further to look at some potential contingent factors, including variables at issue, media, 
and individual levels. The issue-level analysis led to results that verified the cognitive 
priming hypothesis and rejected the need for orientation hypothesis (see section 2.4.3): 
The two-way agenda-setting effects were stronger on high obtrusive issues. In other 
words, both the public and newsrooms are more likely to follow each other’s agenda on 




mechanism is that people are more likely to be influenced when they invest more 
cognitive efforts on issues that they were exposed to previously (Chen, 2009).  
 Given the same issues, the agenda-setting relationships were not significantly 
conditional on media characteristics. Although the Twitter accounts of non-digital-native 
media set the public’s agenda on slightly more issues, none of the directions presented 
results that met the majority rule. The marginal difference may be due to the fact non-
digital-native media are mostly elite, established, legacy media, which in nature gained 
more public attention and could invest more resources in observing the public agenda. No 
consistent patterns were found when comparing media with different political 
orientations. Future studied could try to examine more media characteristics and their 
interaction effects to further explore the conditional agenda-setting effects. 
Different from media characteristics, comparison by individual characteristics 
disclosed strong and interesting differences in the effects. The findings indicated that 
females, white people, and people with lower income and lower education levels were 
more vulnerable to the agenda-setting effects of news media, especially news tweets. 
However, the reverse direction was not conditional on any of the personal characteristics, 
indicating that among the studied population, no evidence was found on the existence of 
a new “digital divide” in terms of reverse agenda-setting power.  
One surprising finding was that it was among participants with lower opinion 
leadership and lower social capital that we could observe a stronger traditional agenda-
setting effect. One potential reason is that the surveyed individuals were not necessarily 




included in survey panels. Given that the reverse direction was not conditional on either 
opinion leadership or social capital, this result may simply imply that opinion leaders 
tended to have a relatively independent agenda. Additionally, if getting back to the two-
step reverse agenda-setting process proposed by Brosius and Weimann (1996), while the 
opinion leaders did not influence the media agenda directly, they might still be the 
indirect agenda-setter via influencing the rest members of the public. Future analyses 
could reach out to a specific group of opinion leaders and consider the indirect route of 
agenda-setting.  
5.4 Methodological innovations  
Alongside the theoretical contributions, this dissertation also made some 
methodological innovations. First, I connected individual-level survey data and digital 
texts, which enables a connection between people’s online and offline activities, as well 
as their attitudes and actual behaviors. Many previous studies (e.g., Barnidge et al., 2018; 
Chan et al., 2012; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2014) overly relied on self-reported data to 
represent people’s online expression, which, on the one hand, can be largely biased as 
people’s memory is not perfect, and on the other hand, normally provide only 
information about expression frequency, not the specific content. By connecting the two 
types of data, we can also connect the two analysis methods: Survey and automated 
content analysis. As Neuman et al. (2014) stated: 
Big data methodologies do not represent a panacea or a substitute for carefully 
designed surveys, experiments, and content analyses. Instead they represent a 




sphere. (p. 210) 
The design of combining of traditional survey method and big data method in this 
dissertation, thus, should inform the future direction of social media research. 
Second, this dissertation applied state-of-the-art machine learning models for 
content analysis. Since the analyses involved millions of news headlines, news tweets, 
and personal tweets, it is beyond the capability of manual content analysis. Deep learning 
models that can take the contexts into consideration, like DistillBERT and BERTweet, 
could be essential tools for communication researchers who are inevitably facing the 
diverse and large digital text data that are accumulating every second. The steps 
described in Chapter 3 should help future researchers to adopt these tools and to build 
standardized procedures. 
Third, I analyzed the relationships addressed in each research question and 
hypothesis from both the aggregate and issue/individual levels. Although plenty of 
agenda-setting studies followed the Acapulco typology coined by McCombs (2004), 
hardly did they compare multiple levels in one study. The results of this dissertation 
showed consistent patterns between the aggregate- and issue/individual-level analyses. 
Since the two levels of analysis have different theoretical meanings, I encourage future 
researchers to provide both to complement each other.  
 
5.5 Limitations and Future Directions 
Like most research, this study is not without limitations. First, the generalizability 




individuals is relatively small given the large cross-individual variation among Twitter 
users. Since I started from survey participants and only collected personal tweets of those 
who successfully provided qualified responses, both datasets might be influenced by the 
biases introduced by the response rate. For instance, the final sample may be skewed 
towards people who have more leisure time to fill a survey and those who are more 
willing to disclose their Twitter handles. Thus, it is unlikely that I would get participants 
who are individuals with top social influence. Most respondents were of small and similar 
influence in their social networks, which could be one of the reasons that I did not find 
significant differences between participants with high and low opinion leadership. As it is 
almost impossible to calculate an accurate response rate of an online survey and to 
validate the characteristics of people who were not included (Glynn et al., 2015; Shah et 
al., 2015), I cannot be sure about how the potential biases could skew the results. Future 
research could try to replicate the study with a larger sample size and/or reverse the order 
of data collection (i.e., try to collect social media posts from a wide range of users and 
reach out to them for the survey later). 
Second, another limitation is the data analysis process is about account validation. 
In this dissertation, participants fill in their Twitter handles willingly. Although different 
strategies were adopted, such as warning the respondents that they should fill in the 
active account owned by themselves and search for the handle right after, I still cannot 
guarantee that the individual-account matching was 100% accurate: People could lie or 
own multiple accounts. One theoretically more precise way to get people’s social media 




SNS platform via APIs. This method was used by Ferrucci et al. (2019) and Wells and 
Thorson (2017). However, the availability of such an authentication process is largely 
determined by platform policies. For instance, Wells and Thorson (2017) noticed that the 
functionality they used to collect data was disabled by Facebook even before the study 
was published. Also, it is more of an ethical concern as getting authentication from 
participants will enable the researchers to access information beyond what is needed for 
the research and introduce potential confidentiality problems. Thus, the data collection 
method here is a hard balance between accuracy and replicability/being more ethical.   
Besides data collection, several limitations exist in the measurements. First, 
although common practice in agenda-setting studies, forcing all digital texts into 19 
issues is a rather arbitrary choice. As McCombs et al. (2014) argued, the rapidly changing 
public attention nowadays has dramatically increased the size of the issue agenda on 
social media. Harder et al. (2017) also proposed a “news story” approach, in which 
“story” is a smaller unit of analysis compared to the issue. Nevertheless, with such a fine 
granularity, a high degree of alignment between two very large sets of issues/stories 
becomes unlikely (McCombs et al., 2014). This dissertation has shown that high 
correspondence existed at a coarse level. It tells us how much the media and the public 
can tell each other “what to think about,” but cannot provide information about how the 
“what to think” part works. Future research could try to use finer units (i.e., more 
issues/stories) or conduct second- and third-level agenda-setting analyses to see if the 
same pattern persists.  




divisions for all variables. This process transferred some continuous variables to 
categorical ones, which enables us to see the differences more clearly, yet sacrificed the 
nuanced distinctions within each category. This measurement strategy was decided 
because after the dimensionality reduction of time-series analysis, the N for analysis was 
only 19. Future research could test the same relationships using parametric analyses with 
a big enough sample size.  
Third, this dissertation used close-ended MIP questions to measure the public 
agenda. Similar to the problem in analyzing the news agenda, close-ended questions 
limited the participants’ choice and could be artificial. Although the list of issues came 
from the established Gallup polls, there might still be missing issues that were important 
to the participants. Thus, future studies could supplement the close-ended questions with 
open-ended ones and conduct content analyses on respondents’ answers.  
Fourth, the wording of the MIP questions could influence the results. Although 
inherited from classic designs, the MIP questions have received criticisms as, for 
instance, its wording shift attention away from the participants’ personal consequences 
(Bartle & Laycock, 2012). Additionally, as mentioned above, asking about the most 
important problem to the society will lead to different answers compared to when we ask 
“what is the most important issue to you.” (Zhang et al., 2012) Thus, a future 
methodological exploration should be empirically comparing responses to four different 
ways of asking about important issues: close-ended social issues, close-ended personal 
issues, open-ended social issues, and open-ended personal issues. 




version two-way agenda-setting framework. While the quantitative results were better at 
answering the “what” questions, following up with more qualitative studies can help us to 
better understand the “how” and “why” questions. For instance, future scholars could 
interview ordinary users about the reasons behind their non-expression or interview 
social media editors about the factors that they have in mind when deciding what to post 
on SNSs. Researchers could also conduct field observations in newsrooms to understand 
how the social media teams work and how their job is influenced by the public agenda on 
SNSs.  
 In summary, this study proposed a multi-version two-way agenda-setting 
framework, which challenged the unified agenda and one-way effect assumptions hidden 
in the traditional agenda-setting theory. It also backed the theoretical framework by 
empirical evidence based on four datasets — two public agendas and two media agendas 
— collected during the 2020 US presidential election. Overall, the results indicated (1) 
two distinctive public agendas, (2) two similar media agendas, and (3) an imbalanced 
two-way relationship. The dissertation also revealed the moderating effect of media type 
on the discrepancies between the media agendas and the differentiated agenda-setting 
effects conditional on issue and individual characteristics. Besides the theoretical and 
methodological contributions, this dissertation also provided implications for journalists 
and social media editors on their daily information collecting and content publishing 
strategies.  
 After almost 50 years since the initial proposal of the agenda-setting theory, 




we are entering “a minimal effect era.” (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008). The results of this 
dissertation did not disprove the traditional agenda-setting effect but added a layer to it — 
the reverse agenda-setting effect. Afterall, the core of the agenda-setting theory is 
salience transfer. It does not necessarily limit the agenda-setter to news media alone. 
With the emergence of the Internet and the hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2017), many 
actors, including the citizens, can become equal contributors to the information flow as 
news media. This theoretical extension of the identity of agenda-setters gives new life to 
this longstanding theory and accordingly encourages more future studies on this multi-






Table 1. Items in scales used in the analyses   






2.38 1.23 854 
Printed news magazine 2.19 1.15 854 
Television news (cable or local 
network news) 
3.57 1.19 854 
Radio 2.73 1.17 854 
Online news 
consumption 
(How often do 





Online news websites 
.840 
3.30 1.14 849 
Citizen journalism sites 
(nonprofessional journalism, 
e.g., blogs) 
2.11 1.17 849 
Facebook 2.84 1.29 849 
Twitter 3.62 1.09 849 
Reddit 2.02 1.22 849 
YouTube 2.72 1.33 849 
Snapchat 1.84 1.24 849 
Instagram 2.40 1.37 849 





to what extent 
you agree with 
the statement.) 
It is difficult for me to express 
my political opinions if I think 
others won’t agree with what I 
say 
.771 
2.51 1.29 854 
There have been many times 
when I thought that the content 
others posted was wrong but I 
didn’t let them know 
3.51 1.22 854 
When I disagree with others, I’d 
rather go along with them than 
argue about it 
2.39 1.18 854 
It is easy for me to express my 
political opinion when it is 
visible to people who I think will 
disagree with me (Reversed)  
2.94 1.31 854 
It is safer to keep quiet than 
publicly speak an opinion that 
you know most others don’t 
share 
2.65 1.23 854 
If I disagree with others, I have 
no problem letting them know it 
(Reversed)  




PS scale (To 
what extend do 
you agree with 
the following 
statement?) 
I usually count on being 
successful in everything I do  
.852 
3.53 1.16 852 
I am rarely unsure about how I 
should behave 
3.29 1.31 852 
I like to assume responsibility 3.71 1.06 852 
I like to take the lead when a 
group does things together 
3.31 1.23 852 
I enjoy convincing others of my 
opinions 
3.47 1.10 852 
I often notice that I serve as a 
model for others 
3.17 1.16 852 
I am good at getting what I want 3.42 1.05 852 
I am often a step ahead of others  3.40 1.07 852 
I own many things others envy 
me for  
2.53 1.27 852 
I often give others advice and 
suggestions  
3.76 1.01 852 
Social capital 
(Please rate to 
what extent you 






I have strong personal 
relationships with my family 
members 
.790 
3.86 1.22 854 
I have strong personal 
relationships with my close 
friends  
4.03 1.10 854 
I have people in life who would 
help me if I needed it, no matter 
what 
4.16 1.05 854 
I like to keep a large network of 
acquaintances 
3.16 1.29 854 
I have a large network of people 
with whom I am friendly 
3.47 1.23 854 
I feel like I am part of my 
community 
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